A uniform approach to National Suicide Bomber Incident response and recovery by Day, Dwayne C.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2008-03
A uniform approach to National Suicide Bomber
Incident response and recovery
Day, Dwayne C.












Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
A UNIFORM APPROACH TO NATIONAL SUICIDE 









 Thesis Advisor:   David Brannan 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
March 2008 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  A Uniform Approach to National Suicide Bomber 
Incident Response and Recovery 
6. AUTHOR(S) Dwayne Day 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
First responders in the United States are not adequately prepared to respond to a suicide bomber attack.  Police, fire, 
and EMS are using protocols that do not anticipate the unique needs of a suicide bomber response.  There is an urgent need to 
develop and implement a consistent approach for responding to suicide bombers. 
This thesis developed a Suicide Bomber Response Framework using International Association of Chiefs of Police 
training documents as the primary source, along with Technical Support Working Group training materials and 
recommendations from relevant national training institutions.  A Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP) full-scale exercise was then conducted for this thesis based on the newly written Framework to identify gaps between 
current standard operating procedures and operating procedures recommended by the Suicide Bomber Response Framework.  
Exercise evaluators identified a significant gap between standard operating procedures of first responders and the 
recommended response procedures in the Suicide Bomber Response Framework.  The thesis argues that a unified suicide 
bomber response approach should be instituted nation-wide.  The Suicide Bomber Response Framework would serve as the 




15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
141 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Suicide, bomber, response, recovery, homeland, security, exercise, 
evaluation, homegrown, terrorist, jihad, weapons of mass destruction, IED, critical infrastructure, 
plans, operating procedures, first responders, shoot to kill, incident command. 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
A UNIFORM APPROACH TO NATIONAL SUICIDE BOMBER INCIDENT 
RESPONSE AND RECOVERY 
 
Dwayne C. Day 
Planner, Delaware Department of Transportation 
B.S., University of Maryland, 1998 
M.S., Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, 2002 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 










Author:  Dwayne C. Day 
 
 








Harold A. Trinkunas, Ph.D. 




























First responders in the United States are not adequately prepared to respond to a 
suicide bomber attack.  Police, fire, and EMS are using protocols that do not anticipate 
the unique needs of a suicide bomber response.  There is an urgent need to develop and 
implement a consistent approach for responding to suicide bombers. 
This thesis developed a Suicide Bomber Response Framework using International 
Association of Chiefs of Police training documents as the primary source, along with 
Technical Support Working Group training materials and recommendations from relevant 
national training institutions.  A Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP) full-scale exercise was then conducted for this thesis based on the newly 
written Framework to identify gaps between current standard operating procedures and 
operating procedures recommended by the Suicide Bomber Response Framework.  
Exercise evaluators identified a significant gap between standard operating 
procedures of first responders and the recommended response procedures in the Suicide 
Bomber Response Framework.  The thesis argues that a unified suicide bomber response 
approach should be instituted nation-wide.  The Suicide Bomber Response Framework 
would serve as the tool for responding agencies to develop consistent response plans 
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A. THE THREAT OF SUICIDE BOMBERS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PREPARING FOR THE THREAT 
Our nation faces a complex and dynamic threat from terrorism.  Despite concerted 
worldwide efforts in the aftermath of 11 September which have disrupted terrorist plots 
and constrained al-Qaeda’s ability to strike the homeland, the United States faces a 
persistent and evolving terrorist threat, primarily from violent Islamic terrorist groups and 
cells.1 
According to the new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on threats to the 
United States, the al-Qaeda terrorist network will likely leverage its contacts and 
capabilities in Iraq to mount an attack on United States soil.  The report lays out a range 
of dangers from al-Qaeda to Lebanese Hezbollah to non-Muslim radical groups that pose 
a “persistent and evolving threat” to the country over the next three years.2  Furthermore, 
the NIE assesses that along with explosive matter for the development of Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IEDs), al-Qaeda will continue attempts to acquire and employ 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material for their attacks.3 
Terrorists worldwide have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness and ability 
to use explosives as weapons, and there is ample intelligence to support the conclusion 
that they will continue to use such devices to inflict harm.  The threat of explosive attacks 
in the United States is of great concern considering terrorists’ ability to make, obtain, and 
use explosives.4   
It is important to realize that one of the more popular tactics in implementing 
weapons of mass destruction is the utilization of a suicide bomber.  The suicide bomber is 
                                                 
1 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security/Homeland Security Council 
October 2007 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 9. 
2 Katherine Shrader and Anne Flaherty, “Terror Threat Against the U.S. Said Serious,” 
WashingtonPost.Com, July 17, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/07/17/AR2007071700099_... [Accessed July 17, 2007], 1. 
3 National Intelligence Estimate, The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2007), 3. 
4 George W. Bush, Directive no. 19, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive-19: Combating 
Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
2007). 
2 
the “ultimate smart bomb,” a human missile relentlessly homing in on the target, yet 
remaining flexible in timing and access.  In this respect, the suicide bomber can change 
their plan of attack to adjust to the ease or difficulty of approach, the paucity or density of 
people or passersby near the target, and whether or not security personnel and other 
terrorism countermeasures are visible at or around the attack site.5   
The Bush administration has coined the term “homicide bomber” to describe what 
formerly was called a “suicide bomber” in the media.  This is appropriate in that the 
bomber’s goal is to kill and injure as many people as possible through the detonation of 
the explosives concealed on their person.6 Each professional or academic scholar that has 
been referenced in this thesis has either referenced the suicide bomber as either a suicide 
or homicide bomber, or a terrorist.  For the sake of consistency throughout this thesis all 
references to the above will be “suicide bomber.” 
Suicide tactics have been adopted by a growing number of terrorist organizations 
around the world because the tactics are shocking, deadly, cost-effective, and very 
difficult to stop.  Furthermore, there are only two requirements that an organization must 
be able to satisfy to enter the game: a willingness to kill and a willingness to die.  Indeed, 
it is the ease and simplicity to suicide bombings which make them so appealing to 
terrorists.7 
Islamic extremists are perfecting suicide bomber tactics, techniques, and 
procedures in Iraq.  The end of the war could possibly shift the focus of suicide bomber 
attacks from Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East to the United States.  It is the policy 
of the United States to counter the threat of attacks aggressively by coordinating federal, 
state, local, territorial, and tribal government efforts and collaborating with the owners 
and operators of critical infrastructure and key resources to deter, prevent, detect, protect 
against, and respond to explosive attacks8. Simply stated, law enforcement and first 
                                                 
5 Bruce Hoffman et al., Preparing for Suicide Terrorism, A Primer for American Law Enforcement 
Agencies and Officers (RAND, 2004), 6. 
6 Governor’s Office of Emergency Services-Law Enforcement Branch, “Response to a 
Suicide/Homicide Bomber 'Pre-Detonation”,” information bulletin, May 30, 2002, 1. 
7 Bruce Hoffman, “Grassroots Defenses, Community Leaders, Business, and Citizens Can Help 
Prevent Suicide Attacks,” Rand Review 30, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 20. 
8 Bush, Directive no. 19. 
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responders need to be prepared to prevent and respond to the situation.  The final 
opportunity for prevention will reside with the ordinary cops on the beat who finds 
themselves confronting a suicide bomber.9 
A logical conclusion resides with the development of a unified response plan to 
suicide bomber incidents. A framework of this nature would allow all first responder 
disciplines to respond using indistinguishable techniques.  This plan, if developed, would 
require state agencies such as law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical services, 
public works, hazardous material, and emergency management disciplines to work 
cohesively with federal agencies to effectively mitigate or recover from a suicide bomber 
incident. 
B.  UTILIZATION OF SUICIDE BOMBER STRATEGY 
During the attacks on 11 September 2001, the United States encountered a suicide 
bombing campaign of profound proportions.  These were the first successful suicide 
bombings in the United States; the terrorists piloting the aircraft were fully aware they 
were engaging in suicide missions.10   
On this day, between 0755 hours and 0842 hours, four planes departed from East 
Coast airports.  Divided among the planes were nineteen hijackers.  There were fifteen 
Saudi Arabians, two Emirates, one Lebanese, and leading them all, an Egyptian, 
Muhammad Atta.  American Airlines Flight 11 struck the north face of the north tower, 
World Trade Center (WTC) 1, hitting the ninety-fourth through ninety-eighth floors.  The 
Boeing 767-200, which departed from Boston, was carrying ninety-two people and an 
estimated ten thousand gallons of jet fuel.  Flight 11 contained five hijackers committed 
to a suicide bomber mission.   
United Airlines Flight 175 struck the south face of the south tower, WTC 2, at 
0902 hours; the impact came between the seventy-eighth and eighty-fourth floors.  The 
aircraft, also a Boeing 767-200 departing from Boston, had sixty-five people and an 
estimated ten thousand gallons of jet fuel aboard.  Flight 175 contained five hijackers 
committed to a suicide bomber mission. 
                                                 
9 Hoffman et al., Preparing for Suicide Terrorism, 15. 
10 An Overview of Suicide Bombers – Part 1 of 2 Vol. 7 (CA: State Terrorism Threat Assessment 
Center, August 19, 2005, n.p.) 1.  
4 
The energy stored in the jet fuel from the two planes was the equivalent of 240 
tons of dynamite.  The energy release was extraordinary, easily surpassing the charts of 
comparison for all other terrorist attacks.  In contrast, the 1996 suicide bomb used to 
destroy the United States military’s Khobar Towers was the equivalent of two and a half 
tons of TNT. The energy released in the Khobar Tower’s bombing was roughly one one-
hundredth as powerful a blast as the two planes striking the WTC. 
At 0940 hours, American Airlines Flight 77 struck the west side of the Pentagon.  
The Boeing 757, with sixty-five people aboard, had departed nearby Dulles Airport en 
route to Los Angeles before being taken over and redirected toward Washington D.C.  
The impact of the plane resulted in a hole five stories high and two hundred feet wide, 
killing 189 people. The flight contained five hijackers committed to a suicide bomber 
mission. 
At 1010 hours, the fourth plane, United Airlines Flight 93, crashed in a field near 
Shanksville, Pennsylvania, eighty miles southeast of Pittsburgh.  The 757, carrying forty-
five people, went down killing everyone aboard.  The hijackers’ target was reportedly the 
White House.11 
In the attacks on 11 September, suicide bombers targeted a prominent public 
American icon and easily identified United States government facilities.  Numerous 
United States government facilities abroad have also attracted suicide bombing endeavors 
in recent years.  On 7 August 1998, just after 1030 hours, a bomb detonated at the 
American Embassy in the Tanzanian capital of Dar es Salaam.  Four minutes later, 
another bomb exploded at the American Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.  For the terrorists, it 
was a triumph of management and just-in-time-production.  No entity had ever staged a 
double truck bombing in which the targets were separated by hundreds of miles.  Al-
Qaeda did not kill as many Americans as anticipated: twelve Americans died in Nairobi 
and none died in Dar es Salaam.  However, the group achieved the dramatic overall boost 
in productivity that it had sought, killing 213 in Kenya and 11 in Tanzania, and wounding 
roughly 5,000 in the two capitals.12 
                                                 
11 Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York, NY: Random House, 
2002), 33-36. 
12 Ibid., 26-30. 
5 
On 12 October 2000, while refueling and taking on supplies in Aden, Yemen, the 
USS Cole was damaged by a suicide boat attack.  The inflatable boat held between 500 
and 700 pounds of C4 explosives.  Witnesses observed the two suicide bombers salute 
and then blow themselves up as they brought the boat alongside the Cole.13  The 
bombing killed seventeen United States seamen and blasted a hole forty feet high and 
forty feet wide through the half-inch-thick steel of the ship’s hull, which nearly resulted 
in the sinking of the vessel.14 
Even before 11 September, suicide attacks had been contemplated or planned but 
never evolved to the stage of execution on United States soil.  Timothy McVeigh 
considered a suicide bomb attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Office Building in 
Oklahoma City before securing a plan that did not require suicide.  Four years before 11 
September, two Palestinians plotted a suicide bombing of the New York City subway.  
Their plan was foiled when an informant tipped off police.  Of course, suicide attacks 
have long been conducted against American diplomatic and military targets abroad: from 
the 1983 bombings of the United States embassies, the Marine barracks in Beirut, 
Lebanon, to the current campaign of suicide attacks in Iraq. 
The spread of suicide terrorism worldwide suggests that the United States will not 
remain immune from this threat.  Trends in terrorism already point to suicide terrorism’s 
rising worldwide popularity.15  The years from 2001 to 2005 alone account for 78 percent 
of all the suicide terrorist incidents perpetrated between 1968 and 2005.  The dominant 
force behind this trend is religion.  It is worth noting that of the thirty-five terrorist 
organizations employing suicide tactics in 2005, 86 percent (thirty-one of thirty-five) 
were Islamic.  This movement, moreover, has been responsible for 81 percent of all 
suicide attacks since 11 September 2001.16   
As of 2005, more than 350 suicide attacks had taken place in at least twenty-four 
countries. The countries include the United Kingdom, Israel, Sri Lanka, Russia, Lebanon, 
                                                 
13 Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center (EMRTC), “Prevention and Response to Suicide 
Bombing Incidents, Operations Level Course Guide,” version 04.05, New Mexico Tech, n.d., 2-22.  
14 Benjamin and Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, 33. 
15 Hoffman et al., Preparing for Suicide Terrorism, 1. 
16 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006), 131. 
6 
Turkey, Italy, Indonesia, Pakistan, Colombia, Argentina, Kenya, Tanzania, Croatia, 
Morocco, Singapore, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq. By comparison, 
twenty years ago at the dawn of the modern era of religious terrorism, this was a 
phenomenon confined exclusively to two countries. Those countries were Lebanon and 
Kuwait.17 
Toward the end of the 1980s, suicide terrorism began to spread beyond the 
Middle East. The first emergence was in Sri Lanka. However, as the 1990s unfolded, the 
tactic spread into India, Argentina, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, and Tanzania.18  
Terrorists have become increasingly attracted to suicide attacks because of their unique 
tactical advantage compared to those of more conventional terrorist operations.   
Suicide attacks, as clearly demonstrated on 11 September, differ from other 
terrorist operations precisely because the perpetrator’s own death is essential to the 
attack’s success.  The means of attack, moreover, can vary widely:   
• Terrorist can turn aircraft into cruise missiles (as in the 11 September 
attacks) or boats into torpedoes (as in the 2000 attack on the USS Cole). 
• Loading a car or truck with explosives can render it a bomb (as in the 
1998 simultaneous attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania). 
• Even pedestrian individuals can become bombs by wearing a specially 
designed vest or belt or by carrying a backpack or small hand-held bag 
containing explosives, all connected to manual or remote-control 
detonators.19 
Just as the means of suicide bombing attacks vary, so must the tactics and 
techniques utilized in responding to these attacks.  Israel has seen this evolution in 
suicide bombings.  When security forces adjust their tactics for preventing suicide 
terrorism, the terrorists adapt.  Examples of this adaptation are suicide attackers dressing 
as Orthodox Jews, dressing as soldiers, utilizing female bombers, bombers attempting to 
blend in with their surroundings, and the use of innovative packaging (guitar case, book 
                                                 
17 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Hoffman et al., Preparing for Suicide Terrorism, 2. 
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bag, etc.).  It is even conceivable for “copy-cats” to adapt the terrorist methods for use 
with motives completely dissimilar to the Middle Eastern bomber.20 The United States 
military has also witnessed this evolution in Iraq.  The early bombings were primarily 
aimed at United States soldiers, yet once force protection measures were implemented, 
bombers sought softer targets.  If suicide attacks begin in this country, the nation should 
be prepared for a similar evolution.21  
One of the most easily implemented and evolving changes that a terrorist 
organization can make is to change the appearance and packaging of suicide bomber 
improvised explosive devices (SBIED’s).  Suicide Bomber IED’s will often appear 
natural in their surroundings; in many cases an IED will be contained or concealed in 
packaging to remain effective and facilitate delivery to its intended target.  Packaging can 
consist of metals, plastics, paper, glass, wood or any combination of these materials.  The 
packaging can enhance the destructive effect and/or disguise the true contents.22 
Delivery of a SBIED is limited to the imagination, resources, knowledge, and 
experience of the bomber.  The avoidance of stereotyping and traditional profiling is 
imperative.  In some cases, an SBIED can not be taken to the target. In such cases, the 
target must be brought to the SBIED.  Examples of this scenario include explosive 
devices detonated when a vehicle passes, or when a crowd moves to the device’s 
(bomber’s) location.  Delivery systems are designed to “fit in” to the terrorist’s intended 
target location.23  
The New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology instructs, in their 
Prevention and Response to Suicide Bombing Incidents course, that suicide bombings 
can be sectioned into three categories determined by design, size, and packaging: 
 
 
                                                 
20 Governor’s Office of Emergency Services-Law Enforcement Branch, “Response to a 
Suicide/Homicide Bomber “Pre-Detonation”,” 2. 
21 EMRTC, “Prevention and Response,” 2-27. 
22 Ibid., 7-29. 
23 Ibid., 7-30. 
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• Type I – The suicide bomber activates an improvised IED carried in a 
bag, box, briefcase or other object.  Typical device sizes range from 11 to 
33 pounds, or 5 to 15 kilograms, including the explosive and any 
additional fragmentation material. 
• Type II – The bomber activates an IED worn under their clothing.  Most 
Palestinian and Tamil Tiger (LTTE) suicide bombers are individual borne 
devices, either Type I or II.  Over 50% of all suicide bombings utilize the 
Type II device.  Body bombs typically weigh from 1 to 22 pounds, or one-
half to 10 kilograms. 
• Type III – The bomber activates an IED concealed in a vehicle.  Most of 
al- Qaeda suicide bombings are vehicle borne.  A vehicle can be a plane, 
auto, ship or even a train. 
In terms of explosive power, Type III incidents pose the most serious hazard.  
However, Type I and II incidents may pose the most significant security challenge 
because countermeasures are often more difficult to implement than countermeasures for 
Type III incidents.24 
C. NATIONAL STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF PLANNING 
Minute-by-minute, the scope and scale of any incident can rapidly evolve, such as 
when a hurricane changes course or it becomes apparent that a terrorist bombing is 
actually one in a series of attacks in multiple cities.  Responders at all levels must be able 
to anticipate the course of an incident and the associated requirements, then work 
accordingly with counterparts to surge or deescalate resources and capabilities as 
indicated.25   
While the vast majority of incidents are effectively handled at the community 
level, some require additional support from nearby jurisdictions or the state. This may 
include support through mutual aid agreements with other states.  In catastrophic or 
highly complex events, all who respond should provide assistance in an organized 
fashion within the existing response framework. It is important to have the framework for 
anticipating the needs and coordinating with partners in advance, as opposed to waiting 
                                                 
24 EMRTC, “Prevention and Response,” 7-29. 
25 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 36. 
9 
for a request.  In many cases, resources and capabilities are provided from surrounding 
areas.  The nation must work together to clarify the processes to request and provide 
assistance. Furthermore, ensuring the necessary awareness, training, and familiarization 
programs for responders to execute related plans and agreements is equally essential.26  
The National Response Framework (NRF) is a guide for the nation in conducting 
all-hazards response. The NRF is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating 
structures to align key roles and responsibilities across the nation, linking all levels of 
government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The guidance is 
intended to capture specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents that 
range from the serious but purely local, to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic 
natural disasters.27 This decision making framework can facilitate important strategic 
planning for specific situations, such as suicide bombings. 
The NRF is written especially for government executives, private sector and non-
governmental organization (NGO) leaders, and emergency management practitioners. 
First, it is addressed to senior elected and appointed leaders, such as federal department 
or agency heads, state governors, mayors, tribal leaders, and city or county officials. 
These are the individuals with the statutory responsibility to provide for effective 
response. For the nation to be prepared for all hazards, the nation’s leaders must have a 
baseline familiarity with the concepts and mechanics of the NRF.28  
Effective response hinges upon well-trained leaders and responders who have 
invested in response preparedness, developed engaged partnerships, and are able to 
achieve shared objectives. The players’ bench is constantly changing, but a concise, 
common playbook is needed by all.29  
The NRF response doctrine defines basic roles, responsibilities, and operational 
concepts for response across all levels of government, NGOs, and the private sector. The 
overarching objective of response activities centers upon saving lives and protecting 
                                                 
26 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security. 
27 Office of Homeland Security, National Response Framework January 2008 (Washington, D.C: U.S. 
Government Printing Office January 2008), i. 
28 Ibid., 1. 
29 Ibid., 2.  
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property and the environment. Five key principles of operations define response actions 
in support of the nation’s response mission. Taken together, these five principles of 
operation constitute the national response doctrine.  
The response doctrine is comprised of five key principles: (1) engaged 
partnership, (2) tiered response, (3) scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational 
capabilities, (4) unity of effort through unified command, and (5) readiness to act.30 
Leaders at all levels must communicate and actively support engaged partnerships 
by developing shared goals and aligning capabilities so that no one is overwhelmed in 
times of crisis. Layered, mutually supporting capabilities at federal, state, tribal, and local 
levels allow for planning together in times of calm and responding together effectively in 
times of need. Engaged partnership includes ongoing communication of incident activity 
among all partners to the NRF, and shared situational awareness for a more rapid 
response. In particular, the potential for terrorist incidents requires a heightened state of 
readiness and nimble, practiced capabilities baked into the heart of preparedness and 
response planning.31 
Engaged partnerships are essential to preparedness. Effective response activities 
begin with a host of preparedness activities conducted well in advance of an incident. 
Preparedness involves a combination of planning, resources, training, exercising, and 
organizing to build, sustain, and improve operational capabilities. Preparedness is the 
process of identifying the personnel, training, and equipment needed for a wide range of 
potential incidents, and developing jurisdiction-specific plans for delivering capabilities 
when needed for an incident.32  
By using a tiered response, incidents are managed at the lowest possible 
jurisdictional level and supported by additional capabilities when needed.  It is not 
necessary that each level be overwhelmed prior to requesting resources from a higher 
level. Incidents begin and end locally, and most are wholly managed at the local level. 
Many incidents require a unified response from local agencies, NGOs, and the private 
                                                 
30 Office of Homeland Security, National Response Framework January 2008, 8. 
31 Ibid., 9. 
32 Ibid. 
11 
sector. Some incidents require additional support from neighboring jurisdictions or the 
state. A small number require federal support. National response protocols recognize this 
reality and are structured to provide additional, tiered levels of support when there is a 
need for more resources or capabilities to support and sustain the response and initial 
recovery. All levels should be prepared to respond, anticipating resources that may be 
required.33  
As incidents change in size, scope, and complexity, the response must adapt to 
meet the requirements. The number, type, and sources of resources must be able to 
expand rapidly to meet needs associated with a given incident. The NRF’s disciplined and 
coordinated process can provide for a rapid surge of resources from all levels of 
government, appropriately scaled to need. Execution must be flexible and adapted to fit 
each individual incident. For the duration of a response, the responders must remain 
nimble and adaptable to the evolution of the situation. Equally, the overall response 
should be flexible as it transitions from the response effort to recovery. The NRF is 
grounded in doctrine that demands a tested inventory of common organizational 
structures and capabilities that are scalable, flexible, and adaptable for diverse 
operations.34  
A forward-leaning posture is imperative for incidents that have the potential to 
expand rapidly in size, scope, or complexity, and for no-notice incidents. Once response 
activities have begun, on-scene actions are based on the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) principles. To save lives, protect property and the environment, decisive 
action on scene is frequently required of responders. Although some risk may be 
unavoidable, first responders can effectively anticipate and manage risk through proper 
training and planning.35   
An effective unified command is indispensable to response activities and requires 
a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each participating organization. 
Success requires unity of effort, which respects the chain of command of each 
participating organization while harnessing seamless coordination across jurisdictions in 
                                                 
33 Office of Homeland Security, National Response Framework January 2008, 10. 
34 Ibid., 11. 
35 Ibid., 8-12. 
12 
support of common objectives. Use of the Incident Command System (ICS) is an 
important element across multi-jurisdictional or multi-agency incident management 
activities. It provides a structure to enable agencies with different legal, jurisdictional, 
and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan, and interact effectively on scene. As a 
team effort, unified command allows all agencies with jurisdictional authority and/or 
functional responsibility for the incident to provide joint support through mutually 
developed incident objectives and strategies established at the command level.36  
D. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
This thesis focuses on discovering the strategic relevance of developing a national 
framework for responding to suicide bomber incidents within the United States.  The 
main claim of the research is that inconsistent localized responses to a potential suicide 
bomber pose an unmitigated risk to citizens and first responders.  Specifically, this 
research will attempt to address the following three questions:  
• How should current suicide bomber response plans be exercised and 
modified to mitigate risk for citizens and first responders?   
• Strategically, how does responding to a suicide bomber incident 
differentiate from a response to other bombings or events in the current 
all-hazards approach?   
• Does the gap between a typical bombing response and a suicide bomber 
response constitute unmitigated risk and therefore warrant the 
development of a separate suicide bomber response strategic plan? 
An initial step in the research was to conduct a thorough literature review to 
analyze the strategic knowledge gained by countries experiencing suicide bomber 
incidents.  The literature was further scrutinized to determine how this knowledge 
translated into the mitigation of risk for the citizens and first responders of the affected 
nation.  
A second step of the research was the planning and execution of a suicide bomber 
full-scale exercise in accordance with the national standards contained in the Homeland  
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Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP).  This endeavor would allow for the 
identification of gaps between documented response and recommended best practices for 
the situation. 
A final step of the research was crafting a tentative solution through the drafting 
of the Unified Suicide Bomber Response Framework. 
E. TENTATIVE SOLUTION 
In keeping with the intent of the NRF, and in order to effectively respond to a 
suicide bomber incident, there should be a unified suicide bomber response framework 
that can be used by any law enforcement, emergency medical services or fire department 
in the nation when responding to a suicide bomber incident.  The guide has the basic 
tactics, techniques, and procedures that all agencies should follow and train towards.  
This guide needs to be available to the above agencies as a template so each discipline 
can develop response plans unique to their jurisdictional needs, prior to suicide bombers 
striking again on the nation’s homeland. 
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II. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
A. THE CONCEPT OF PLANNING AND PREVENTION 
The threat posed by suicide bombers is already a reality for American law 
enforcement agencies and personnel. The threat seems likely to grow in scope and 
magnitude in the foreseeable future.37 Islamic extremists are continually refining suicide 
bomber tactics, techniques and procedures in Iraq.  Conclusion of the war in Iraq has the 
potential to shift the focus of suicide bomber attacks from Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 
Middle East to the United States.   As the world watches suicide bombing evolve in the 
Middle East, experts in the field of counter-terrorism continue to predict the eventual 
emergence of the tactic in the United States.  Law enforcement and first responders need 
to be prepared to prevent and respond to the situation.  The final opportunity for 
prevention will reside with the ordinary cop on the beat who finds themself confronting a 
suicide bomber.38  
To successfully counter this method of destruction, a national multi-discipline 
response and recovery framework should be developed.  This framework would allow all 
homeland security identified first responder disciplines to respond using indistinguishable 
techniques.  The plan would require state and local agencies in the law enforcement, fire 
service, emergency medical services, public works, hazardous material, and emergency 
management disciplines to work cohesively with federal agencies to effectively mitigate 
or recover from a suicide bomber incident. 
The framework would include strategic guidance on the identification of suspect 
suicide bombers, confrontation of suicide bombers, and the strategy of response once 
suicide bomber detonation has occurred. The framework would also emphasize the 
importance of the localized policy, procedural, and training initiatives that must be in  
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place to achieve the preventive potential of the guidance.39  Unfortunately, few United 
States law enforcement agencies have trained officers on tactics specifically designed to 
interdict and cope with suicide bombing tactics.40   
An effective defense against suicide terrorism must be as nimble, flexible, and 
adaptive as are the terrorists’ planning, reconnaissance, and attacks.  Law enforcement 
can not rest on past accomplishments in the areas of plans, procedures, and policies. The 
discipline must keep abreast of historical, existing, emergent, and probable future terrorist 
targeting patterns and modi operandi.41 Unfortunately, response procedures typically 
taught in law enforcement academies, colleges, and fire schools have not and do not teach 
how to respond to a suicide bomber incident.42 The framework suggested by this thesis 
seeks to address this shortcoming.  Now is the time, before suicide terrorism occurs in the 
United States on a further scale, to develop and implement plans, policies and procedures 
that will effectively reduce, if not preempt and deter, such attacks. 
B. THE STRATEGY OF NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS 
Preparedness is inextricably intertwined with national security, counter-terrorism, 
and homeland security strategies.  The nation has taken essential steps over the past five 
years through plans, policies, and guidelines to strengthen its ability to prepare for, 
protect against, respond to, and recover from the natural and man-made disasters that will 
occur.43  However, the nation must go further and continue to build upon the foundation 
of national and homeland security established since 11 September to improve 
preparedness capabilities.  The response to Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the 
imperative to integrate and synchronize policies, strategies, and plans into a unified 
system for homeland security.  This unifying system will greatly facilitate national 
preparedness.44 
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As a nation, a shared vision or commitment to preparedness has yet to be 
developed. It is essential for the nation to contemplate what must be done to prevent, 
protect against, respond to, and recover from the next catastrophe.  In the absence of a 
shared vision that is acted upon by all levels of the nation and encompasses the full range 
of our preparedness and response capabilities, a truly transformational national state of 
preparedness can not be achieved.45 
While the responsibility for national security rests with the federal government 
working with its international partners, the precepts of federalism make every level of 
government and region of the country both a contributor to, and responsible for, 
homeland security.46 
While it is necessary for agencies at all levels of government to work cohesively 
to ensure the security of our nation, there are significant institutional and 
intergovernmental challenges to information and resource sharing, as well as operational 
cooperation.  These barriers stem from a multitude of factors — different cultures, lack of 
communication between departments and agencies, and varying procedures and working 
patterns among departments and agencies.  Equally problematic, there is uneven 
coordination in pre-incident planning among state and local governments.  For example, 
the states and territories developed fifty-six unique homeland security strategies, as have 
fifty high-threat, high-density urban areas.  Although each state and territory certainly 
confronts unique challenges, without coordination this planning approach to response 
planning does not sufficiently acknowledge how adjoining communities and regions can 
and do support each other.47 
There have been significant strides in making the United States and its allies more 
secure, yet safety is not assured.  The nation has important challenges ahead as it wages a 
long-term battle not just against terrorists, but against the ideology that supports their 
agenda.  Terrorist networks today are more dispersed and less centralized.  The networks 
are more reliant on smaller cells inspired by a common ideology and are less directed by 
a central command structure. Some states, such as Syria and Iran, continue to harbor 
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terrorists at home and sponsor terrorist activity abroad. The terrorists have declared their 
intention to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction to inflict even more 
catastrophic attacks against the United States and its allies, partners, and other interests 
around the world.48  
The United States government and its partners have thwarted numerous attacks 
from the terrorist networks.  However, prevention is never perfect.  Successful terrorist 
attacks have occurred throughout the world, ranging from Bali to Beslan to Baghdad.  
While the United States has substantially improved air, land, sea, and border security, the 
homeland is not immune from attack. The ongoing fight for freedom in Iraq has been 
twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry for those seeking to resurrect the 
victorious ages of the caliphates in the Middle East.  Furthermore, their increasingly 
sophisticated use of the Internet and media has enabled the terrorist enemies to 
communicate, recruit, train, rally support, proselytize, and spread their propaganda 
without risking personal contact.49 The tentacles of terrorism are ever present in modern 
society; therefore the United States can not risk the cost of an apathetic stance against an 
evolving enemy.   
C. STRATEGY OF THE TERRORIST 
From the terrorists’ point of view, al-Qaeda is implementing a rational strategic 
plan to achieve its publicly stated goals.  The Western public remains largely unaware of 
these goals. The horrific acts carried out by terrorists capture the headlines, yet their 
stated strategic objectives remain buried in the footnotes of any discussion.  Their goals 
are not very difficult to fathom.  The strategy is reflected in various public declarations; 
particularly in the statements made by bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders.  The 
strategic goals of al-Qaeda have three focus elements:  
• Initial strategic focus: to drive overt and covert United States forces from 
Muslim lands in the Near and Middle East. Covert American forces are 
entrenched in Saudi Arabia. The country houses the most important 
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Islamic holy places, including Mecca, the prime destination for millions of 
Muslim pilgrims from around the world each year.  
• Second strategic focus: halting the unqualified U.S. military and political 
support for Israel.  
• Tertiary strategic focus: end the United States support and manipulation of 
corrupt puppet regimes in Saudi Arabia and other dictatorships of the Near 
East, Middle East, and North Africa.50  
Most suicide terrorism is undertaken as a strategic effort directed toward 
achieving particular political goals. It is not simply the product of irrational individuals or 
an expression of fanatical hatreds.  The main purpose of suicide terrorism is to use the 
threat of punishment to coerce a target government to change policy. The tactic is 
especially valued when it can prompt democratic states to withdraw forces from territory 
which terrorists view as their homeland.  The record of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 
2001 exhibits tendencies in the timing, goals, and targets of attack that are consistent with 
this strategic logic but not with irrational or fanatical behavior. The first element is 
timing.  Nearly all suicide attacks occur in organized, coherent campaigns, not as isolated 
or randomly timed incidents. The second element is the support of nationalist goals.  
Suicide terrorist campaigns are directed at gaining control of what the terrorists see as 
their national homeland territory, especially at ejecting foreign forces from that territory. 
The third element is target selection.  All suicide terrorist campaigns in the last two 
decades have been aimed at democracies or countries exploring the viability of 
democracy, which make more suitable targets from the perspective of the terrorist.51 
D. A RECENT HISTORY OF SUICIDE TERRORISM 
The key to understanding suicide terrorism is not attempting to profile individual 
bombers. Insight resides in examining the strategic, practical, and ideological experiences 
of groups that have employed this mode of violence as an integral, or at least temporary, 
component of their overall operational agendas.  Several such organizations exist, notably 
including Hamas (Palestine), Palestinian Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade 
                                                 
50 Fathali M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They 
Come to Destroy (Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006), 5. 
51 Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97, 
no. 3 (August 2003): 3. 
20 
(Palestine), LTTE (Sri Lanka), al-Qaeda (global), Hezbollah (Lebanon), the Kurdish 
Worker’s Party (Turkey), the al-Jemaah al-Islamiyya network (Southeast Asia), and 
Chechen rebel entities (Russia).  Four of the organizations are generally acknowledged to 
have shared a highly “intimate” relationship with suicide terrorism as a sustained tactic. 
The organization known as Hezbollah not only hailed the modern advent of 
suicide terrorism, but also graphically demonstrated its remarkable coercive utility 
against both the United States and Israel. The organization known as Hamas has been at 
the forefront of Palestinian suicide terrorism for the past decade. The LTTE is widely 
credited with being at the cutting edge of suicide technology and “expertise.” Al-Qaeda 
perpetrated the most destructive act of suicide terrorism to date and remains firmly 
committed to the ongoing use of the tactic in whatever manner possible.52 
Al-Qaeda will likely continue to enhance its ability to attack the United States 
through greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups, particularly al-Qaeda in Iraq. 
It is currently the group’s most visible, capable affiliate and the only one known to have 
expressed a desire to attack on United States soil.  Moreover, although officials have 
discovered only a handful of individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qaeda senior 
leadership, the group likely will intensify its efforts to place operatives in the United 
States.  The nation must never lose sight of al-Qaeda’s persistent desire for weapons of 
mass destruction, as the group continues to try to acquire and use chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear weapons.53 
In addition to al-Qaeda, a host of other groups and individuals also use terror and 
violence against the innocent in pursuit of their objectives. These entities pose potential 
threats to the security of the United States.  The group includes Lebanese Hezbollah, 
which has conducted anti-American attacks outside the United States and, prior to 11 
September, was responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist 
organization.54 
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Since 11 September, convictions show that terrorists and their organizations are 
actively planning attacks domestically in the United States.  Significant convictions 
include Zacharias Moussaoui for his role in helping al-Qaeda carry out the 11 September 
attacks, and the “shoe bomber” Richard Reid, who was sentenced to life imprisonment 
for attempting to destroy American Airlines Flight 63.  Other convictions and examples 
include: 
• Hermant Lakhani, convicted in New Jersey and sentenced to forty-seven 
years in prison for attempting to sell an antiaircraft missile to a man he 
believed represented a terrorist group intent on shooting down a United 
States commercial airliner; 
• Iyman Faris, convicted in Virginia of providing material support to al-
Qaeda by surveying possible targets to attack in the United States, such as 
the Brooklyn Bridge, and reporting this information to al-Qaeda; 
• Lynne Stewart, Mohammed Yousry, and Ahmed Abdel Sattar, convicted 
in New York on charges in connection with passing messages to the 
terrorist organization The Islamic Group from Sheik Abdel Rahman, The 
Group’s imprisoned leader; 
• Sheik Mohammed Ali Hasan al Moayad and Mohammed Moshen Yahya 
Zayed, convicted in Brooklyn of conspiracy to provide material support to 
al-Qaeda and Hamas; 
• Mohammed Junaid Babar, convicted in New York of providing material 
support to al-Qaeda; 
• Five brothers, Ihasan, Hazim, Ghassan, Bayan and Basman Elashi, 
convicted in Dallas, Texas of conspiring to export proscribed computer 
equipment to state sponsors of terrorism;  
• Ahmad Omar Abu Ali, convicted in Washington, D.C. for providing 
material support to terrorist organizations in connection with the May 
2005 bombings in Saudi Arabia; 
• Uzair Paracha, convicted in New York of identity document fraud and 
violating regulations issued under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act by acting as a conduit for material support to al-Qaeda; 
22 
• Six United States citizens in Buffalo, New York pled guilty to providing 
material support to al-Qaeda and admitted to training in al-Qaeda-run 
camps in Afghanistan; 
• Six defendants in Portland, Oregon pled guilty to charges relating to their 
attempt to travel to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
against the United States and allied troops;55 
• Jose Padilla, the Brooklyn-born convert to Islam who was once accused by 
the government of plotting a “dirty bomb” in the United States, was 
sentenced to seventeen years and four months in prison for his role in a 
conspiracy to help Islamic jihadist fighters abroad;56 
• The federal government has charged five alleged Islamic radicals with 
plotting to kill United States soldiers at Fort Dix, New Jersey.  Their goal 
was to figure out how to kill as many American soldiers as possible;57 
• Federal authorities said a plot by a suspected Muslim terrorist cell to blow 
up John F. Kennedy International Airport, its fuel tanks and jet fuel artery 
could have caused “unthinkable” devastation.  In an indictment charging 
four men, one of them is quoted as saying the foiled plot would “cause 
greater destruction than in the 11 September attacks,” destroying the 
airport, killing several thousand people and destroying parts of New 
York’s borough of Queens, where the pipeline runs underground.58 
From the terrorist point of view, the United States population elects the President 
and the members of Congress who make important political decisions.  Consequently, the 
United States population bears some responsibility for what al-Qaeda sees as United 
States military attacks against Muslim nations. Therefore, the United States population is 
seen as a legitimate military target in the war between al-Qaeda and the Untied States.  
By attacking civilian populations in the United States, the United Kingdom and other                                                  
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“occupying” countries, terrorists deem it possible to influence elections and policies.59 
By delivering the battle to the homeland of their stated enemy, al-Qaeda does maintain a 
measure of forward movement to their agenda. 
E. THE RELEVANCE OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
Terrorist groups are setting a dangerous trend of using suicide bombers to destroy 
targets far away from their theaters of war.  Many groups are likely to use suicide 
bombers to infiltrate target countries and conduct suicide attacks against Western leaders 
and critical infrastructure in the foreseeable future.60  Before 11 September, the critical 
infrastructures in the United States were weakly protected against sabotage or terrorism.  
Most Americans were blissfully ignorant about the size of the nation’s vulnerability and 
about the ubiquity of rewarding targets for those who do not bear well wishes for the 
United States.61 Likewise, a team of terrorists could enter the country through any of the 
5,000 public airports, 361 seaports and hide among the 500 million persons crossing the 
United States borders every year.62 Some authors hold that it is al-Qaeda’s strategy to 
“bleed America to bankruptcy.” Al-Qaeda has threatened to attack critical Western 
infrastructures, the “hinges” of the world economy as bin Laden calls them.63 
Critical infrastructure is defined as “an infrastructure so vital that its incapacity or 
destruction would have a debilitating impact on national defense and national security.”64  
Today’s definition of critical infrastructure includes eleven sectors and five key assets.  
This definition emerged from an earlier definition that included only five sectors, and is 
likely to expand with the evolution of society.  According to the national strategy, critical 
infrastructure and key assets encompass the following eleven sectors: agriculture and 
food, water, public health, emergency services, defense industrial base,  
telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking/finance, chemicals and hazardous 
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materials, and postal/shipping. The five “key assets” are described as the national 
monuments and icons (Statue of Liberty, etc.), nuclear power plants, dams, government 
facilities (offices and governmental departments), and commercial key assets (major 
skyscrapers).65 
For a more in-depth look at what entails a specific sector, a catalog of the 
“Energy” infrastructure objects and facilities that require protection entails 104 
commercial nuclear power plants, 2,800 power plants, 300,000 oil and natural gas 
producing sites, 1,400 gas product terminals, 160,000 miles of crude oil transport, 2 
million miles of pipelines, 80,000 dams, and 170,000 water systems.66 
Critical infrastructure protection is defined as the strategies, policies, and 
preparedness needed to protect, prevent, and when necessary, respond to attacks on these 
sectors and key assts.67 The suicide bomber campaign of 11 September was an attack on 
banking and finance, government facilities, and commercial key assets using the 
transportation sector.  Therefore, two critical infrastructure sectors and key assets have 
already been attacked or involved in a major attack.68 
The devastation of 11 September demonstrates how attacks on infrastructure can 
result in massive casualties, sizeable economic impact, political ramifications, and 
psychological damage, not to mention damage to the American psyche.  These are 
collectively called “attacks on the American Way of Life.” Because of their potential to 
disrupt an entire society, critical infrastructure protection must be one pillar of the 
homeland security strategy.69   
It is the policy of the United States to enhance the protection of the nation’s 
critical infrastructure and key resources against terrorist acts based on six criteria. The 
first criterion examines if catastrophic health effects or mass casualties comparable to 
those from the use of weapons of mass destruction would occur. The second criterion 
contemplates the impairment of federal departments and agencies’ abilities to perform 
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essential missions, or to ensure the publics’ health and safety. A third criterion examines 
if the state and local government capacities to maintain order and to deliver minimum 
essential public services would be undermined. The fourth criterion contemplates if there 
would be damage to the private sector’s capability to ensure the orderly functioning of 
the economy and delivery of essential services. The fifth criterion seeks to determine if 
there would be a negative effect on the economy through the cascading disruption of 
other critical infrastructure and key resources. The final criterion poses the salient 
question to determine if the public’s morale and confidence in our national economic and 
political institutions has been undermined.70 
Homeland security, particularly in the context of critical infrastructure and key 
asset protection, is a shared responsibility that cannot be accomplished by the federal 
government alone.  It requires coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local 
governments; the private sector; and concerned citizens across the country.  The fifty 
states, four territories, and 87,000 local jurisdictions that comprise the United States have 
an important and unique role to play in the protection of our critical infrastructure and 
key assets.71 The relevance of a national strategic framework for suicide bomber response 
is most keenly felt from this perspective. Inconsistency in the strategic framework’s 
application creates weaknesses, which in turn creates opportunity for the application of 
the strategy of the suicide bomber. 
F. THE ROLE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION  
Adding to the concern about suicide attacks is their potential connection to 
increasingly available new technologies.  Although so-called “weapons of mass 
destruction” were not used in the 11 September attacks, the destruction was nonetheless 
unquestionably “massive.”  The prospect of combining modern weapons technology 
(especially chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological weapons) with an age-old 
willingness to die in the act of committing an attack could be unprecedentedly 
dangerous.72  Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of terrorists are among 
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the greatest threats to national security.73 Terrorists have openly declared both their 
desire to develop and their intent to employ weapons of mass destruction against the 
United States, its partners, and its interests around the world.74  The threat of a terrorist 
WMD attack has increased due to an evolution of terrorist groups into decentralized, ad 
hoc organizations which are harder to target and eliminate.  Additionally, the new 
terrorist organizations have greater access to WMD materials and the technical expertise 
to achieve their weaponization.75  
“Weapons of Mass Destruction” are carefully defined in Title 18, U.S.C. 2332a. 
They include explosive, incendiary, or poison gases, bombs, grenades, rockets having a 
propellant charge of more than four ounces,  a missile having an explosive or incendiary 
charge of more than one-quarter ounce, a mine or similar device.  Also included are 
weapons which are designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through 
the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors 
agents.  Biological weapons involving a disease organism are included, as are weapons 
designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life. 76  
Clearly the effort on the part of the government has been to narrowly and specifically 
detail the types of weapons included under this title, noting their special or particular 
danger from more traditional terrorist threats. 
Homemade explosives or improvised explosive devices (IED) are derived from 
ordinary and inexpensive materials that can be procured locally.  Commercially available 
fertilizer can be used, as can more sophisticated military ordnance if it can be obtained, 
such as plastic explosives.  Detonation requires only a simple electric charge, provided by 
a few 1.5-volt batteries activated by pressing a button or simple plastic plunger-type 
device, which can be purchased at hardware stores.  Screws, nails, nuts and bolts, ball 
bearings, or metal shards provide the antipersonnel component of the weapon.77 
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There are six types of suicide IEDs.  These are: the human-borne suicide IED, 
also know as the suicide bodysuit; the vehicle-borne suicide IED; the motorcycle-borne 
suicide IED; naval craft-borne suicide IED; scuba diver-borne IED; and the aerial-borne 
(microlight, glider, mini-helicopter) suicide IED.  Each of the six categories has been 
used in South Asia and the Middle East.78  
The suicide body suite has evolved to improve its concealment and is becoming 
increasingly small.  Initially, the device was a square block of explosives worn in the 
chest and the belly area.  Gradually the device evolved into a heart-shaped block of 
explosives placed just above the naval.  As body searches for suicide devices are usually 
conducted around the abdomen, a group is also developing breast bombs.79 
Most suicide body suits have limited electronics, making it difficult for security 
agencies to develop counter-technologies to detect the devices.  A suicide body suit can 
be constructed from commercial items.  With the exception of malleable plastic 
explosives and the detonator, the remaining components can be purchased from a tailor 
shop (stretch denim) and an auto shop (steel ball bearings, wires, batteries and switches).  
Furthermore, when a device is sophisticated it becomes difficult to operate and becomes 
challenging to fix when it fails to function.  For these reasons, suicide devices will likely 
remain simple.80 
In sum, terrorists are becoming increasingly effective by using suicide attacks, 
and the trend points to a catastrophic unconventional terrorist attack that could make the 
11 September attacks in New York and Washington pale in comparison.  The strategic 
response of the United States relies on overwhelming military force to crush evolving 
jihadist swarms, but this inflexible and maladaptive strategy only propagates leaner and 
meaner mutations of suicide networks and cells.81 
The most promising way to contain suicide terrorism then is to reduce the 
terrorists’ confidence in their ability to carry out attacks on the target society.  States that 
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face persistent suicide terrorism should recognize that neither offensive military action 
nor concessions alone are likely to do much good and should invest significant resources 
in border defenses and other means of homeland security.82 Now is the time, before 
suicide terrorism occurs in the United States on a further scale, to develop and implement 
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III. SUICIDE BOMBER 
A. THE RELIGIOUS FRAMEWORK 
In the weeks immediately following the tragedy of 11 September, a genuine 
interest emerged in understanding the ‘whys’ of the event.  Why ‘they’ hate us, why 
‘they’ were prepared to kill themselves, why such a thing could happen.83  Though it is 
impossible to offer any comprehensive survey of Islam and the roots of modern Islamic 
militancy in only a few thousand words, specific elements are of critical importance.84 
These elements include the sacrificial acts of jihad as it applies to the Shahada85 and the 
deeply imbedded faith of the radical extremist.  
Newer trends since the start of the millennium pose distinct challenges, making 
the threat posed by suicide bombers not only more prominent in recent years but also 
more frequently motivated by religion.  From 2000 to 2003, more than 300 suicide 
attacks killed more than 5,300 people in seventeen countries and left additional thousands 
wounded.  At least 70 percent of these attacks were religiously motivated, with more than 
100 attacks by al-Qaeda or affiliates acting in al-Qaeda’s name.86 
“Suicide bomber” is a term, with derogatory overtones, coined in the West to 
represent what in Islam is known as a Fedayeen (this can have other non-suicide 
meanings related to resistance) or Shahid, a martyr.  The intent of the bomber is not 
suicide.  The intent of the bomber is to kill infidels in battle.  Visiting death upon the 
infidels is not only permitted by Muhammad, but encouraged with liberal promises of 
heavenly reward.87  
The religious and theological justification communicated and encouraged by 
Muslim clerical authorities has played an important role in framing popular attitudes 
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toward suicide operations and encouraging followers to carry out acts of self-sacrifice on 
behalf of the Muslim community.  Characteristic of this role was a sermon given by 
Sheikh Ibrahim Madhi on April 12, 2001, at the Gaza City mosque. The sheikh’s sermon 
was broadcast live on Palestinian television and advised followers, “…anyone who does 
not attain martyrdom in these days should wake in the middle of the night and say, “My 
God, why have you deprived me of martyrdom for your sake, for the martyr lives next to 
Allah.”  He then called on Allah to “accept our martyrs in the highest heavens…and raise 
the flag of Jihad across the land.”88 
It is a mistake to see jihad as merely a tactic aimed at achieving a specific worldly 
goal.  This point is critical in understanding why acts of spectacular terror, especially 
those involving the suicides of the attackers, occur.  Fundamentally, acts of jihad are 
conceived as demonstrations of faith performed for God by an individual.  The immediate 
local aims or enemies are largely irrelevant.  Jihad is part of a cosmic struggle, and thus 
to expect an immediate result from the endeavor would be presumptuous and wrong.  
Though jihad will eventually result in victory, should Allah will it, the victory may be 
generations, centuries, even millennia into the future.  It is the act that is important, not 
the results.  Jihad is conceptualized as an eternal process of affirming faith that should be 
performed by all Muslims at all times.89 
The sacrificial quality in jihad combines with another essential element of Islam, 
the Shahadah, the “testament” or the bearing witness, with a potency that is of critical 
importance for understanding what happened on 11 September.90 
The Shahada is the first of the five ‘pillars of Islam’ which make a Muslim a 
Muslim.  The call to prayer, the adhan, includes the lines ‘ash-hadu an la illaha illallah, 
ash-hadu Mohammed ur rasulullah’ which are translated as ‘I bear witness that there is no 
god but Allah, I bear witness that Mohammed is His prophet.’  The Shahada is both a 
statement of profound personal faith and a declaration to others, a ‘bearing witness.’  
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Serving as a witness needs an audience other than God, who is after all omniscient. Jihad 
shares this demonstrative quality, particularly when combined with that ultimate 
affirmation of faith — martyrdom.91 
The Arabic Qur’anic word for martyr or the martyred, shahid, also means witness.  
It comes from the same root as ‘shahadah.’  This is critical for understanding the world 
view and the motivations of contemporary Islmaic militants.  In the last paragraph of the 
final instructions Mohammed Atta gave the hijackers on the eve of the 11 September 
attack is the injunction to ‘let [their] last words be “There is no god but God and 
Mohammed is His prophet.”92  The suicide bombers knew the witness to the testament 
they verbalized with the Shahadah and demonstrated at that moment with their 
martyrdom would be counted in the billions, courtesy of satellite television. 
The suicide attack demonstrates faith and strength to the individuals the bomber, 
and his commanders, seek to motivate.  The attack seeks to make it impossible to ignore 
what the martyr believes, and furthermore strongly suggests only something with inherent 
value, authenticity and power could provoke such an act.  Concurrently, it suggests the 
‘cosmic struggle’ is also a reality. Concluding this equation is the element of shame.  A 
suicide attack, an incredible sacrifice carried out ‘on their behalf,’ presents a challenge to 
a spectator’s own absence of faith or inaction.93  
A suicide attack is designed to demonstrate faith is lacking on one side and exists 
on the other.  Therefore it forces all witnesses aware of the martyr’s action to conclude, 
regardless of the apparent imbalance of forces, when the most important quality is 
considered, which is faith, it is the suicide bomber who has it in greatest depth. It is faith 
that is necessary for victory in the long-term struggle.  In an interview in September  
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2002, al-Zawahiri stated this explicitly, saying, “It is the love of death in the path of 
Allah that is the weapon that will annihilate this evil empire of America, by the 
permission of Allah.” 
Theological arguments are regularly invoked by the organizations responsible for 
the attacks and by the community that approvingly supports the attacks.  The Qur’an, 
however, expressly forbids suicide.  It is considered as on of the “greatest wrong-doings” 
a Muslim can commit. This is according to Abu Ruqaiyah, an Islamic philosopher and 
author of a detailed treatise addressing religious legitimacy of suicide terrorism.  
Accordingly, a semantic distinction has been devised that differentiates suicide — the 
taking of one’s own life — from martyrdom, in which the perpetrator’s death is a 
requirement for the attack’s success and is thereby justified and accepted.  Suicide 
terrorism therefore becomes the ultimate expression of selflessness and altruism.94    
B. THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY 
Islamic extremism refers to the political philosophy that postures, in order to 
defend a carefully defined vision of Islam and protect pious Muslims around the world, 
that one must impose essentially a seventh century political structure over people of the 
Islamic world. Furthermore, this political structure must be implemented by violent jihad, 
or Holy War.95 
Most Sunni Islamist extremists movements follow a conservative Islamic tradition 
know as Salafism.  Salafism is rooted in the belief the Koran and the teachings of the 
Prophet Muhammad and his companions are the most legitimate sources of religious 
conduct and reasoning, and as such should be emulated and practiced in contemporary 
Islamic communities.  Some contemporary Salafists believe violence is a legitimate 
means of reasserting control of the world’s Islamic community.  Salafi Jihadists represent 
a small percentage of the overall Salafi population, but have proven very influential with 
al-Qaeda’s distorted interpretation of Salafi Islam attracting Muslims from around the 
world.96 The vision of the jihadists is to restore the purity of Islam as it existed during the 
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time of the Prophet Muhammad in the 7th century. This would serve as a counterbalance 
to the United States and the West.  Bin Laden draws upon a long tradition of intolerance 
within a stream of Islam, which flows from Ibn Taymiyyah through Sayyid Qutb, and his 
ideology depicts America as the front of all evil, the “head of the snake.”97 
Osama bin Laden’s message is taken from the Salafi Jihadist tradition which calls 
for a global Islamic state under the control of the Muslims and the teachings of the 
Prophet Muhammad.  When al-Qaeda’s message is interpreted in light of an extremist’s 
intentions, such words are intended to polarize the Islamic world into two clearly 
delineated factions: one that is against the West and the other that is closely tied to the 
United States and its allies.  Osama bin Laden has called for a war against the United 
States and the West to remove their presence from Muslim territories. He views this as 
the first step to restoring the Muslim Caliphate, ruled by one Caliph.98  
C. THE PERSPECTIVE OF SUNNI AND SHIITE 
The differences between the Sunni and Shiite Islamic sects are rooted in 
disagreements over the succession to the Prophet Muhammad, who died in 632 AD, and 
over the nature of political leadership in the Muslim community.  The historic debate 
centered on whether to award leadership to a qualified and pious individual who would 
lead by following the customs of the Prophet, or to preserve the leadership exclusively 
through the Prophet’s bloodline.  The question was settled initially when community 
leaders elected a close companion of the Prophet named Abu Bakr to become the first 
Caliph (Arabic for “successor”).  Although most Muslims accepted this decision, some 
supported the candidacy of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, 
husband of the Prophet’s daughter Fatima.  Ali had played a prominent role during the 
Prophet’s lifetime, but he lacked seniority within the Arabian tribal system and was 
bypassed as the immediate successor.99 
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This situation was unacceptable to some of Ali’s followers who considered Abu 
Bakr and the two succeeding caliphs (Umar and Uthman) to be illegitimate.  Ali’s 
followers believed that the Prophet Muhammad himself had named Ali as successor and 
the status quo was in violation of divine order.  A few of Ali’s partisans orchestrated the 
murder of the third Caliph Uthman in 656 AD, and Ali was named Caliph.  Ali, in turn, 
was assassinated in 661 AD, and his sons Hassan and Hussein died in battle against 
forces of the Sunni Caliph.  Those who supported Ali’s ascendancy became later known 
as “Shi’a,” a word stemming from the term “shi’at Ali,” meaning “supporters” or 
“helpers of Ali.”  There were others who respected and accepted the legitimacy of his 
caliphate but opposed political succession based on bloodline to the Prophet.  This group 
constituted the majority of Muslims. They came to be known in time as “Sunni,” meaning 
“followers of (the Prophet’s) customs (sunna).”  In theory, Sunnis believe the leader, an 
imam, of the Muslim community should be selected on the basis of communal consensus, 
on the existing political order, and on a leader’s individual merits.  This premise has been 
inconsistently practiced within the Sunni Muslim community throughout Islamic 
history.100  
Osama bin Laden is a Sunni Muslim. 101The majority of the world’s Muslim 
population follows the Sunni branch of Islam, and approximately 10-15% of all Muslims 
follow the Shiite branch.  Shiite populations live in a number of countries, but they 
constitute a majority in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan.  There are also significant 
Shiite populations in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and 
Yemen.  Sunnis and Shiites share most basic religious tenets.  However, their differences 
sometimes have served as the basis for religious intolerance, political infighting, and 
violent confrontations.102 
Open source information has identified at least nineteen Sunni extremist 
organizations that both share al-Qaeda’s ideology and have the capability to reach the 
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United States and our interests overseas.103 According to the U.S. military, which has 
been working on developing a “typical suicide bomber” profile, most attackers in Iraq are 
believed to be foreigners — many from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab States, but 
increasingly of late from North Africa as well.  The bombers are mostly recruited from 
Sunni communities, smuggled into Iraq via Syria after receiving instruction and 
indoctrination, fitted into their explosives-filled vests, and dispatched to their death.104   
Coalition success in the global war on terrorism has forced al-Qaeda’s core 
elements increasingly to reach out to other Sunni Islamist extremists groups for support.  
Historically, the “other” groups have focused their efforts against local targets. Yet, there 
is growing evidence these groups are more willing to work with bin Laden.  Some of the 
groups have received training, weapons and funding from al-Qaeda.  Others have 
received only ideological inspiration while remaining organizationally and operationally 
distinct. 105 To Osama bin Laden, the end of the reign of the caliphs in the 1920s was 
catastrophic, as he made clear in a videotape made after 11 September.  On the tape, 
broadcast by Al-Jazeera on October 7, 2001, he proclaimed, “What America is tasting 
now is only a copy of what we have tasted…Our Islamic nation has been tasting the same 
for more than eighty years, of humiliation and disgrace, its sons killed and their blood 
spilled, its sanctities desecrated.”106Although these groups pose less danger to the United 
States homeland than al-Qaeda’s core elements, they are increasingly a threat to the 
nation’s interests abroad.  Such groups could reasonably seek an opportunity to attack the 
United States in the future.  Even if Osama bin Laden is captured or killed tomorrow, 
Sunni extremist groups may seek to attack U.S. interests for decades to come.107   
D. ELEMENTS OF MOTIVATION 
In the terrorists’ society, there must reside a segment of the population which 
believes in violence or perceives alternative strategies have failed.  Thusly, there needs to 
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be an existing level of violence which has become institutionalized and assumes a ‘life of 
its own.’  The individuals who perpetrate suicide attacks have many social, cultural, 
religious, and material incentives. These include spiritual rewards in the afterlife, the 
guarantee of a place with God for the attackers’ families, the aura of celebrity, and even 
cash bonuses. 108   
In cost-benefit terms, suicide attacks are financially inexpensive.  Monetary 
rewards for terrorist organizations, on the other hand, can be large.  Suicide bombings 
frequently draw sympathy from sources distant from the location of the attacks, 
especially donors who are willing to enable others to die in the service of a cause.  For 
example, following a supermarket bombing by an 18-year-old Palestinian girl, a Saudi 
telethon reportedly raised more than $100 million for the Palestinians.109 
From a group perspective, suicide attacks generate more publicity than other types 
of attacks.  The fate of the bomber is part of the story, and the large number of victims 
ensures public attention.  Sometimes the goal of an organization is simply to draw 
attention to itself and to its cause. Given the current state of ubiquitous media, suicide 
bombers are more likely to be noticed.  Since the main effect of the violence is intended 
to be impressed upon an audience, the shocking nature of the attack is part of the 
calculation.110  
From the perspective of the individual bomber, the act of “martyrdom” may offer 
an opportunity to impress an audience and be remembered, an act that may be a powerful 
incentive for individuals who perceive their lives as having little significance 
otherwise.111  Although some have argued that suicide bombers are coerced, this is not 
borne out by the evidence.  The individuals are in fact subject to intense group pressure to 
sacrifice for the greater good.  Individuals most easily manipulated for such purposes also 
tend to be young and impressionable.112 There is often a sense of desperation or almost 
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inhuman determination on the part of the suicide attacker.  The rituals in which the 
prospective bomber typically engages are designed to make it virtually impossible to 
withdraw from an attack without losing honor and a place in society.  Sometimes 
prospective bombers are encouraged to lie down in graves to have the feeling of peace 
that they are told they will experience after death.113  
Radical jihadist terrorist organizations have created a recruitment and support 
mechanism of compelling theological incentives to sustain their suicide bombing 
campaigns.  These incentives, moreover, are designed to appeal both to the would-be 
bomber and to their family. While male recruits, for instance are promised the proverbial 
seventy-two virgins in paradise, the families of male and female bombers are induced to 
support — if not encourage — their relations’ homicidal, self-destruction by the promise 
of an assured place for seventy relatives in heaven.  In her book on female Palestinian 
suicide bombers, American journalist Barbara Victor recounts a conversation she had in 
January 2003 with Shiek ‘Abu Shukheudm. The Shiek detailed for Victor the seven 
rewards according to Islamic tradition that are bestowed on the martyr for his act of self-
sacrifice: 
From the moment the first drop of blood is spilled, the martyr does not 
feel the pains of his injury, and is absolved of all bad deeds; he sees his 
seat in Paradise; he is saved from the torture of the grave; he is saved from 
the fear of the Day of Judgment; he marries seventy-two beautiful black-
eyed  women; he is an advocate for seventy of his relatives to reach 
Paradise; he earns the Crown of Glory, whose precious stone is better than 
all the world and everything in it.114 
In point of fact, the Quran makes no such specific promises — whether about the 
seventy-two black-eyed virgins or seventy of the martyr’s relatives will be admitted to 
heaven.  Nonetheless, various Muslim clerics repeat and perpetuate these ethereal 
promises, which the martyrs and would-be martyrs readily accept.  Parents and other 
family members doubtless also believe the ethereal promises of the clerics. Although 
saddened by the death of their relatives, the family takes comfort in their own assured 
ascension to heaven.115 
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Some individuals appear driven by a sense of humiliation or injustice.  Some 
argue, for example, that perceptions regarding the plight of the Palestinian people 
influence the willingness of young Egyptians, Saudis, Iraqis, and others to participate in 
suicide bombings.  Others appear to be driven by the desire for personal revenge because 
they have suffered the loss of a loved one.  Nicole Argo’s interviews of failed suicide 
bombers in Israeli prisons elucidate the connection between loss and revenge: When 
asked why they became martyrs or shahids, her interviewees responded: 
Pictures of dead kids had a major affect on me.  Many were killed [right] 
before me, like my friend [whose body] I had to carry in my own 
arms…[A]fter the istishhad (martyrdom) of a friend of mine, and after the 
murder of a baby...These two cases made me think that human life is 
threatened every moment without good cause…without distinction 
between those [of us] who are soldiers, civilians, adults or kids…116 
A longing for religious purity and/or a strong commitment to the welfare of the 
group may drive individuals to engage in suicide terror.  Religious ideology or political 
culture can be crucial.  Suicide attacks in some contexts inspire a self-perpetuating 
subculture of martyrdom.  Children who grow up in such settings may be subtly 
indoctrinated into a culture glorifying ultimate sacrifice in the service of the cause against 
the enemy people or in the service of a cult like leader.  Palestinian children as young as 
six (both male and female) report their wish to grow up and become Istishhadis — often 
not yet understanding the full impact of this declaration.  Yet, by the age of 12 the youth 
are fully committed and deemed appreciative of what becoming a martyr entails.117 
E. THE TAMIL TIGER INFLUENCE 
The work of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) is often cited as a formative influence in 
the techniques of suicide bombing. Their endeavors in the 1980s and 1990s are the 
indicators of success harkened by others that sought to emulate their methods.  The 1983 
Marine barracks bombing led, at least indirectly, to the initiation of perhaps the most 
ruthless and bloody suicide campaign in modern history by the LTTE.  Their first attack 
occurred in Sri Lanka in May 1987.  The LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran later 
claimed he was inspired by the 1983 attacks. They have since been responsible for more 
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than half of all suicide attacks carried out worldwide.118 It is the only group to have killed 
two world leaders, the former prime minister of India, Rajiv Ghandi, and the President of 
Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe Premadasa,  using male and female suicide bombers.119 
The LTTE represent an ethnic independence movement, not a religious 
movement.  The special groups of suicide bombers they train, the so-called Black Tigers, 
are a strategic force against the much larger and better equipped government forces.  The 
motivation of the Black Tigers has always been to achieve and independent Tamil 
homeland. Their motivation is not based in religious zeal.120  
The LTTE is fighting for an independent Tamil state in northeastern Sri Lanka.  
As the quality of targets chosen by the LTTE is high, it has a sophisticated training 
program that requires at least one year.  As well as training the bomber, the LTTE 
research unit tests the effects of explosives on dogs and goats to ensure the attack is 
successful.121 
F. THE EVOLUTION OF FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBERS 
A common stereotype exploited by terrorists in order to magnify their cause is the 
perception women are gentle, submissive and nonviolent.  On the one hand, despite the 
prejudices describing women as good wives and mothers, they are still capable of murder 
by engaging in suicide terror.122   
Female suicide bombers are relatively new.  The first know attack came in 1985 
when a 16-year-old girl, Khyadali Sana, drove a truck into an Israeli Defense Force 
convoy and killed two soldiers.  The first female LTTE bomber, Dhanu, successfully 
killed Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991.  The first female PKK suicide bombing 
in June 1996 may also be the first instance of an apparently pregnant bomber, who was 
responsible for killing six Turkish soldiers.  The bomber’s name remains unknown.123 
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Even more concerning is the growing number of women offering themselves as suicide 
bombers.  Chechen terrorists began using female suicide bombers in attacks on Russia in 
2000.  Up to 40 percent of the suicide bombings carried out by the LTTE in Sri Lanka 
and India involved women, and women of the PKK have carried out a number of attacks 
against Turkish Armed Forces.124 
Suicide bombers have often been drawn from widows or bereaved siblings who 
wish to take vengeance for their loved one’s violent death.  There is an empirical 
regularity in Chechnya, Palestine and Sri Lanka wherein suicide bombers have lost a 
family member to the “unjust state” and feel their only meaningful response to express 
their outrage is to perpetrate an act of suicide terror.  The loss of the relative might also 
signal to the insurgent organization this person is a potential recruit who is unlikely to 
change their mind at the last minute or defect from the cause.125 The first istish-hadiyat 
(female martyr) in Israel, representing the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, was Wafa Idris, a 
paramedic who detonated a 22-pound body bomb filled with nails and metal objects in a 
shopping district.  Wafa killed an 81-year-old man and injured more than 100 people.  
The first PIJ bomber was a 19-year-old student, Hiba Daraghmeh, who detonated a bomb 
in a shopping mall, killing three people.  The second PIJ bomber, 29-year-old lawyer 
Handi Jaradat, strolled into a highly frequented restaurant in October 2003 and killed 
twenty-one Israeli and Arab men, women, and children.126 
Widowhood may sever the woman from productive society and/or leave her with 
a sense of hopelessness, especially in traditional societies.  The surviving family 
members of people tortured to death by the security services have also filled the ranks of 
suicide bomber volunteers, and human rights abuses by the state only serve to shore up 
the justifications for violence made by the most extreme organizations.127  The first 
Russian “Black Widow” or saliheen, Hawa Barayev, acted on behalf of the Chechen 
rebels in June 2000 and killed twenty-seven Russian Special Forces soldiers.128  There 
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have been allegations that Tamil women raped by the Sinhalese security services and 
military at check points join the LTTE as the “Birds of Paradise” unit of female suicide 
bombers.129  
A higher percentage of women have been featured in off-the-battlefield suicide 
operations, which requires infiltration, invisibility and deception.  A woman staged the 
suicide operation that killed Rajiv Gandhi in India.  Most suicide operations in Turkey 
are by women.130 A female Hamas bomber, 22-year-old Reem al-Reyashi, on January 14, 
2004, killed four Israeli soldiers at a checkpoint.  Of particular note is that Reem was a 
mother who left behind a husband, a 3-year-old son, and a 1-year-old daughter.131 For 
many reasons, women are the preferred choice of secular groups when it comes to 
infiltration and strike missions.  First, women are less suspicious.  Second, in the 
conservative societies of the Middle East and South Asia, there is a hesitation to body 
search a woman.  Third, women can wear a suicide device beneath her clothes and appear 
pregnant.132   
Moreover, the fact a woman attracts greater media attention is an asset, in and of 
itself, to the organization that sponsored her suicide mission.  The organization and its 
particular cause or grievances will almost automatically enjoy greater exposure, which in 
large measure is an immediate aim of the bombing itself.  In turn, morale and enthusiasm 
among the rank and file are heightened.133 International security expert Yoram 
Schweitzer of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University states “the 
enlistment of women from Belgium, India, Iraq, Turkey and the West Bank territories for 
suicide attacks in 2006 indicates that their role continues and may, in fact, represent a 
growing phenomenon.”134 A number of factors have led the FBI to warn that female 
suicide bombers could be deployed by al-Qaeda against the United States in the future.135   
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G. CHARACTERISTICS AND DEMOGRAPHICS AS INDICATORS 
Suicide bombings have emerged as an intrinsic component of this new era of 
terrorism.  Although not new, violent martyrdom had once been a prominent feature of 
Middle Eastern terrorism some 700 years before its dramatic reemergence in 1983. Both 
the scale and sophistication of this manifestation of terrorism have escalated markedly 
over the last few years.136 
From the perspective of the individual attacker, the act of martyrdom in the 
pursuit of honor may offer an opportunity to impress an audience and be remembered.  
This symbolic act may be a powerful incentive for individuals who perceive their lives to 
have little significance otherwise.  Jessica Stern has argued engaging in such activities 
affords a way out of a life of boredom, poverty, despair and likens becoming a suicide 
martyr to the Muslim version of “outward bound.”137 
There are two kinds of individuals who become suicide bombers. The first are 
people produced by an organization under a subculture. The second are educated 
outsiders who flock to the organization to volunteer because of personal reasons.  These 
two groups are often comprised of very different kinds of individuals with varying 
degrees of educational backgrounds, abilities and profiles.138 
The stereotypical image of a suicide bomber is that of an irrational, homicidal 
fanatic or at least an individual who is acutely socially maladjusted. The individual is 
usually assumed to originate from a highly impoverished family context with minimal 
formal education.  However, when one examines the background of martyrs, it is evident 
they do not readily fit in to this simplistic personification.  As Scott Atran observes: 
Recruits are generally well-adjusted in their families and liked by peers, 
and often more educated and economically better off than their 
surrounding population.  Researchers Basel Saleh and Claude Berrebi 
independently find that the majority of Palestinian suicide bombers have 
college education (versus 15% of the population of comparable age) and 
that less than 15% come from poor families (although about a third of the 
population lives in poverty).  DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] sources 
who have interrogated al-Qaeda detainees at Guatanamo note that Saudi-
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born operatives, especially those in leadership positions, are often 
“educated above reasonable employment level, a surprising number have 
graduate degrees and come from high-status families.”…The general 
pattern was captured in a Singapore Parliamentary report on prisoners 
from Jemaah Islamiyah, an al-Qaeda ally [and widely believed to be 
behind the August 2003 suicide bombing of the U.S. owned Marriott 
Hotel in Jakarta]:  “These men were not ignorant, destitute or 
disenfranchised.  Like many of their counterparts in militant Islamic 
organizations in the region, they held normal, respectable jobs.  Most 
detainees regarded religion as their most personal value.”139 
Although only a tiny number of people become suicide terrorists, these 
individuals come from a broad cross section of lifestyles, and it may be impossible to 
concisely profile them in advance.140 The 11 September bombers were from comfortable 
middle-to upper middle class families and were well educated.  This is a movement not of 
poor, miserable people but of highly educated people who are using the image of poverty 
to make the movement more powerful.141 The Palestinian suicide bomber of the 1980s 
may be different than the second generation Englishman of Pakistani descent that blew 
up a London bus in 2005.  The female Chechen suicide bomber may be a “Black Widow” 
whose motivations differ from those of a male Egyptian expatriate living in Germany, 
training in Afghanistan, murdering thousands in the United States.142 
When suicide terrorism first surfaced in the 1980s, it was largely confined to a 
handful of countries and was committed or perpetrated by no less than a half-dozen 
groups.  Today, suicide terrorism has spread to an estimated twenty-five countries 
throughout the world.  Virtually every continent, except perhaps Antarctica, has 
experienced a highly-credible threat if not a suicide attack.  Currently thirty-five groups, 
six times the number from twenty years ago, are perpetrating suicide terrorist attacks.143  
The fundamental characteristics of suicide bombings, and its strong attraction for 
the terrorist organizations behind it, are universal:  suicide bombings are inexpensive and 
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effective.  This method of attack probably cost no more than $150 to mount, and requires 
no escape plan.  The attacks are less complicated and compromising, and guarantee 
media coverage.144  The success rate is high because the bomb is, in effect, a “smart 
bomb” that can modify the exact location and timing of the attack based on a real-time 
assessment of the target.  A person wearing a bomb is far more dangerous and far more 
difficult to defend against than a timed device left to explode in a marketplace.  This 
human weapons system can effect last-minute changes based on the ease of approach, the 
paucity or density of people, and the security measures in evidence.145   
Recently, “lone wolves,” individuals acting on their own or with only an 
accomplice or two, have received notable attention.  Timothy McVeigh, responsible for 
bombing the Murrah building in 1995, and Ramzi Yousef, who organized the first attack 
on the World Trade Center in 1993, are the two most prominent examples.  The 
document most often associated with the “lone wolf” phenomenon is Leaderless 
Resistance by Louis Beam, a prominent figure in the Ku Klux Klan.146  Beam makes 
clear the concept of “leaderless resistance” poses operational as well as political 
problems.  To succeed, an individual will need to master a number of different skills.  For 
example, he will need to perform reconnaissance, select a target, acquire resources, build 
bombs, maintain weapons, and perform a number of counterintelligence evaluations.  In 
summation, an individual will need to carry out all the functions a terrorist organization 
does, but with a fraction of the human resources.147  
In the last few years there has been a significant increase worldwide in the 
number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by suicide bombers, whether on foot, in a vehicle, 
by air, or sea.  What is more alarming is suicide bombers could be homegrown terrorists, 
born in the United States and living amongst the populace.148 During an interview 
Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said that the United States faces a 
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heightened threat of a terrorist attack “for the foreseeable future” but any attack will 
likely be home-grown.  Chertoff described a home-grow attack as a single person or 
small group of people living in the United States who were “recruited” on the Internet 
and pledged their allegiance to al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.149  In London, 
Casablanca, Madrid, the Netherlands and elsewhere, homegrown terrorist cells comprised 
of second and third generation radicalized Muslims have proven difficult for authorities 
to track and preempt.  Such homegrown cells have been able to train and prepare in 
secrecy, escaping detection even from the local community.  Although the United States 
has not seen this phenomenon on the same scale as our European allies, the potential for 
America to face homegrown terrorism is very real.150  
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 
a University of Maryland database, contains information on worldwide terror incidents 
since 1970. The database reports one of every seven terrorist attacks is carried out by a 
home-grown extremist.  The July 2005 bombings in London support this trend, and may 
provide further insight into the future of terrorist activities.  These terrorists were home-
grown, born and reared in the United Kingdom.  Although their ties to al-Qaeda remain 
unclear, the individuals were willing to conduct attacks to support al-Qaeda’s global 
jihad.151 
As suicide terrorism evolves, more Western, female and prison converts to radical 
Islam, and second-generation citizens in non-Islamic nations, may choose to become 
suicide bombers.152 The potential for radicalization of prison inmates in the United States 
poses a threat of unknown magnitude to national security of the United States. With the 
world’s largest prison population of over two million people and highest incarceration 
rate of 701 of every 100,000, America faces what could be an enormous challenge. Every 
radicalized prisoner becomes a potential terrorist recruit.  Former Attorney General  
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Albert Gonzales  stated that “the threat of homegrown terrorist cells — radicalized 
online, in prisons, and in other groups of socially isolated souls — may be as dangerous 
as groups like al-Qaeda, if not more so.”153  
H. TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES 
Although it was not the first such attack, many people date the initiation of a wave 
of contemporary suicide attacks to the October 1983 destruction of the United States 
Marine barracks in Beirut by a truck bomb. This was a watershed event, particularly for 
Americans.  The explosion lifted the entire building from its foundation and caused it to 
implode.  At almost precisely the same time, a similar truck bomb exploded at the nearby 
French peacekeeping compound.  The 1983 Beirut attacks resulted in the withdrawal of 
United States and French forces from Lebanon.  These withdrawals have subsequently 
been pointed to by al-Qaeda and other groups as important indicators suicide attacks can 
be extremely effective against Western democratic powers.154 
The organization of suicide operations is extremely secretive.  The success of the 
mission is dependent on a number of elements: a high level of secrecy, thorough 
reconnaissance, and thorough rehearsals.  Secrecy enables the preservation of the element 
of surprise, critical for the success of most operations.155 
Suicide bombings are not conducted alone. The terrorist organizations recruit 
bombers, conduct reconnaissance, prepare the explosive device, and identify the target.  
Each local cell has one or more individuals who function as “hubs.” Each hub is 
connected to numerous other individuals within the cell and, although he or she may be 
only marginally connected to figures within the national organization, he or she runs the 
local operations. Individuals recruited and dispatched as suicide bombers are not 
connected to the hub. For reasons of operational security, the suicide bombers operate on 
the periphery of the group. 
The traditional concept of security is based on deterrence, where the terrorist is 
either killed or captured.  The success of a suicide bomber operation is dependent on the 
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death of the bomber.  The suicide bomber is not worried about capture, interrogation 
(including torture), trial, imprisonment and the accompanying humiliation.156 
Furthermore, in suicide attacks there is no need to provide an escape route or to 
plan for the extraction of the bomber.  The group does not have to concern itself with 
developing an escape plan, often the most difficult phase of an operation.  Therefore, a 
suicide bomber could enter a high security zone and accomplish his/her mission without 
worrying about escape or evasion.  The certain death of the attacker enables the group to 
undertake high quality operations while protecting the operational security of the 
organization and its cadres.  As every prisoner has a point of breaking under 
psychological or physical pressure, the certain death of the bomber or bombers prevents 
the captor from extracting information.157 
Although over 70 percent of terrorist attacks utilize explosives, suicide terrorists 
may also select biological, chemical, or incendiary weapons of mass destruction. 158 
Equally important but often overlooked is the use of small-arms weapons.  This tactic 
was illustrated in the brutal machine-gun and hand-grenade attack carried out by 
Egyptian Islamic militants on a group of Western tourists, killing eighteen, outside their 
Cairo hotel in April 1996.159  
When suicide bombings first begin in 1983 in Israel, the bombers were 
theoretically easier to spot.  They tended to carry their bombs in nylon backpacks or 
duffel bags rather than in belts or vests concealed beneath their clothing as is the current 
practice.160 In order to make an attack more lethal, terrorist often use nuts, bolts, screws, 
ball bearings, any metal shards or odd bits of broken machinery are packed together with 
homemade explosive and then strapped to the body of a terrorist dispatched unnoticed to 
any place where people gather.161 Another recent innovation is the addition of chemical 
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additives such as rat poison, which is an anticoagulant and makes it very difficult for 
rescue workers to stem the hemorrhaging of the injured victims.162 
The motivations for suicide attacks are not so different in many ways from the 
motivations for other types of terrorism, including attention to a cause, personal 
notoriety, anger, revenge and retribution against a perceived injustice.  A terrorist will use 
suicide attacks because the method generally results in a larger number of casualties on 
an average than other types of terrorist attacks.  According to data from the RAND 
Corporation’s chronology of international terrorism incidents, suicide attacks on average 
kill four times as many people as other terrorist acts.163  Suicide attacks usually attract 
more publicity than other types of attacks and can be especially intimidating for the target 
population.   
I. COMBATING THE METHODS OF ATTACK 
There is a perception that suicide attacks are unstoppable. The impression is 
perpetuated not only by the logistical challenges of detecting and repulsing the threat, but 
also by the impression the attacker is driven by a desperate determination.164 
Nonetheless, there are both offensive and defensive measures which may reduce 
the number and/or severity of attacks.  Among the offensive measures are vigorous 
intelligence collection, preemptive strikes against the organizations that orchestrate 
suicide attacks (especially their leaders), and efforts to reduce the ability of terrorist 
organizations to recruit suicide candidates.165 
Defensive measures against suicide attacks include preventing perpetrators form 
physically accessing the target.  The goal is to make it significantly more difficult for an 
organization to achieve a successful attack, increasing the costs in relation to the benefits 
gained through the attacker’s death.  This includes the full range of measures in 
homeland defense, from physical barriers to security screening to strict border controls.   
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Some also suggest decreasing the quantity or profile of potentially symbolic targets, by 
measures such as restricting unnecessary travel in dangerous areas abroad or controlling 
the availability of sensitive information on the Internet.166 
Israel has extensive experience in dealing with terrorist organizations.  The 
experience prompted the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and government to establish an 
array of measures to stop terrorist attacks and at least diminish the results of a successful 
attack.  This entails the three principle parts of Israeli counter-terrorism tactics. These 
include defensive measures, offensive measures, and punitive measures.167 
The goals of the offensive measures are to stop the materialization of planning in 
its early phase or thwart the training phase of a terrorist attack.  Defensive measures are 
intended to disrupt the terrorist who are proceeding to a target.  Lastly, punitive measures 
punish the perpetrators, the architects, and the supporters of the terrorist attacks.168 
The Israeli Army, Air, and Naval Force constitute what is known as the IDF.  The 
IDF is the main organization used to execute Israeli counter-terrorist actions.  The IDF’s 
doctrine is defensive at the strategic level, while the tactics it employs are offensive.  
Working with the IDF is the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) and Shin Bet.  The two 
agencies work to support the IDF by providing intelligence.169 
The reduction of suicide bombers in Israel can be contributed to the deployment 
of Israeli Defense Force (IDF) personnel into the West Bank and its continuing presence 
in all the major Palestinian population centers that Israel regards as wellsprings of the 
suicide campaign.  Their presence has involved aggressive military operations to pre-
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terrorist infrastructures, military leaders have an array of options at their disposal. The 
options include air barrages, ground invasions, naval raids, and surgically concise attacks 
against the head of terrorist organizations.171   
Israeli defensive measures are barriers put in place to impede terrorists in their 
attempt to carry out attacks within Israel.  The goal is to stop terrorists at the very 
beginning of an attack while they are still en-route.  The Israeli’s understand they cannot 
protect everything, they acknowledge the reality of limited resources.  The most 
influential defensive measure put in place has been the security fence.  The security 
fencing was designed to prevent suicide attacks from occurring on Israeli citizens.172 The 
Gaza Strip is already surrounded by an electronic fence.  This is the reason why suicide 
bombings rarely originate from the area.  The security fence between Israel and the West 
Bank is an extended structure composed of barbed wire and electrical metal with a tall 
concrete wall hosting lookout towers and snipers.173 In 2004, the security fence was cited 
by the IDF as being a key factor in the 45 percent drop in the number of people killed in 
terrorist attacks compared to 2003.  A senior IDF officer attributed the improvement in 
fighting Palestinian terror to the security fence, highly improved human intelligence, and 
tighter cooperation between IDF, Police, and Shin Bet agents.174 
In addition to the fence, curfews and other restrictions on the movement of 
residents has been imposed.  At night the entire area is under curfew so it is difficult for 
terrorists to move about and hide without being noticed.  This alone cannot be 
responsible for the success of the IDF’s strategy. Continued success is absolutely 
dependent on regularly acquiring intelligence and rapidly disseminating it to operational 
units prepared to take appropriate action.175 
In Israeli businesses there frequently exist armed guards quizzing patrons before 
they enter establishments. The guards inquire if the patrons are armed and pat down the 
individuals feeling for suicide bomber vests full of explosives.  Establishments that can 
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not afford a guard or are unwilling to pass the cost on to their customers simply keep 
their doors locked, responding to knocks with a quick glance through the glass and an 
instant judgment as to whether a person can be safely admitted.176 
The punitive measures instituted by the IDF and the Israeli Supreme Court are 
considered illegal actions by the United Nations and the international community.  
Nevertheless, the Israelis consider these punitive actions as necessary methods aimed at 
discouraging future terrorists.  In Israel, punitive measures are aimed at discouraging 
Israeli citizens from aiding and spurring terrorism.177 
Within the Occupied Territories, there are laws established which guarantee that 
individuals involved in terrorist groups will receive the harshest penalties allowed for 
crimes against Israel.  The Israeli punitive system within the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
permits the capture, imprisonment, and exile of terrorists.  A common and recurring 
practice is for the Israeli Army to demolish or seal the houses of persons who have 
committed offences or who are suspected of having committed such offences.  In 
particular, the homes of persons who have carried out suicide bombings within Israel, 
against settlers or soldiers are always demolished in the aftermath of such attacks.178 
Up until February 2005, Israel continued this policy even though it is not as 
effective as other measures.  A key reason the policy of demolishing homes is not 
effective is the fact that Hamas continues to pay people whose houses are destroyed. The 
financial assistance of Hamas is easily sufficient to rebuild a better and larger house.  
Other reasons why this policy is not effective reside in the fact it gives other terrorist 
incentives for attacks stimulated by vengeance.  Finally, there is the resulting public 
relations disaster.  When the rest of world sees an Israeli soldier razing a house with a 
family standing near-by crying hysterically, the justification behind the razing is lost on 
the viewing audience.179 
                                                 
176 Hoffman, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” 1. 
177 Smith, “The Effectiveness of Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” 38. 
178 Ibid., 39. 
179 Ibid., 40. 
52 
Experts in the field of counter-terrorism predict suicide tactics will eventually be 
used in the United States.  Many of these experts believe a substantial terrorist 
infrastructure already exists in the United States.180  The element of suicide itself helps 
increase the credibility of future attacks because it suggests that attackers cannot be 
deterred.  The capture and conviction of Timothy McVeigh gave reason for some 
confidence that others with similar political views might be deterred. However, the deaths 
of the 11 September hijackers did not offer this hope. Americans would have to expect 
that future al-Qaeda attackers would be equally willing to die.181    
An even more troubling phenomenon is the discovery of possible cells in the 
United States itself.  In essence, the 11 September hijackers were infiltrators to the United 
States, taking advantage of permeable borders to plot their attacks.  The arrests of alleged 
militants in Lackawanna, Seattle, Detroit, Chicago, Florida and Portland also indicate 
Islamic radicalism is appealing to individuals rooted in American communities.  The FBI 
estimates several hundred militants linked to Al-Qaeda are currently in the United 
States.182  In the event suicide attacks are deployed in the United States there are a few 
recommendations for reducing the threat.  Currently these recommendations include 
understanding the terrorist’s operational environment, developing strong, confidence-
building ties with the communities from which terrorists are most likely to come, and 
mounting communications campaigns to eradicate support from these communities.183   
Suicide terrorism is practiced because it has successfully forced troop withdrawals 
and other concessions in Lebanon, Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and 
Spain.184  Consider the score card prior to 11 September.  In 1983, United States forces 
left Beirut after the successful attack on the Marine barracks.  In 1984-1986, the United 
States made concessions to buy the freedom of hostages in Lebanon.  In 1993, the United 
States withdrew its forces after the Black-Hawk-Down incident in Mogadishu.  After the 
attack on the al-Khobar Towers in 1998, there was no obvious United States response.  
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When embassies were bombed that same year in Kenya and Tanzania, the response 
consisted of ineffectual cruise-missile attacks.  There was no visible response to the USS 
Cole incident in 2000.  In due course came 11 September, which did spawn a massive 
and powerful response.185 Given the complexities of terrorism itself, governmental 
responses to this problem must also be multi-faceted.  Global, long-term efforts to modify 
the demographic, political, theological, and cultural wellsprings of terrorism and suicide 
terrorism must be undertaken.  Prevention “at the source” entails disrupting staging areas 
in the several countries which choose to harbor terrorists.  Prevention at the “end of the 
line” entails target-hardening of critical infrastructure targets.  “Along the way” 
antiterrorism can be implemented by controlling the movements of people and weapons 
at national borders.186   
If a suicide bomber can be stopped before reaching the target, many lives will be 
saved, not to mention possibly saving millions of dollars in critical resources.  
Unfortunately, most law enforcement agencies have not trained their officers on tactics 
specifically designed to respond to suicide bombing incidents.  The development of a 
Suicide Bomber Response Plan has been left up to the individual agencies.   
The late Professor Ehud Sprinzak, an Israeli scholar and one of the world’s 
foremost authorities on terrorism, had long argued: “Contrary to popular belief, suicide 
bombers can be stopped — but only if security authorities pay attention to their methods 
and motivations.”  Israeli experience shows, despite the significant death toll suicide 
attacks inflict initially, it is possible to counter this threat effectively, through proper 
attention, focus, preparations, and training.187 Training and detailed instruction are 
needed on how to identify the suspicious, tell-tale signs of a suicide bomber.  The 
training must entail how to confront such a bomber or suspected bomber.  Furthermore, 
in the event the bomber detonates his or her explosive device, the training must teach 
how to respond to a suicide attack and secure the site.  Simple policy and procedures 
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must be developed, clarified, adopted, and rehearsed in advance, so that, for example, an 
officer confronting a suicide bomber knows which actions he or she may take and which 
decisions he or she may make without first contacting a supervisor or special unit for 
instructions.188   
Training in this respect, requires specific instruction in mental preparedness for 
unusual and unexpected circumstances.  According to one knowledgeable source who has 
trained Israeli police in these techniques, this entails teaching police how to process 
information to produce the most desirable outcome.  A positive assessment, this trainer 
continues, will lead to a positive psychological reaction.  Doubts and hesitation will 
create fear and possibly paralysis — a negative psychological reaction.  Simulations, for 
instance, have demonstrated that it is not the degree of fear and stress that adversely 
affects performance but the reaction to the fear and stress.  The most positive outcome 
results from correctly assessing the situation, and this depends on the ability to detect 
new information from observation, separate what is useful from what is useless, and 
respond as quickly as possible.  Attentiveness, alertness, concentration, and focus over 
extended periods are some of the mental skills police officers can be trained to further 
develop.  The officer is trained to absorb information specific to the situation according 
to detailed criteria to produce appropriate reactions.  The significance of the reactive 
behavior is focus, where thinking and doing become one action.  In extreme situations, 
one cannot allow concentration to drift away to the contemplation thought of “what will 
happen if.”  Every extraneous thought is an obstacle to the best possible reaction.  For a 
positive reaction, it is necessary to focus on the moment.  Most panicked reactions come 
from losing this focus and ceasing to concentrate.  If one can stay ‘within the moment,’ 
there is usually sufficient room for proper reaction (email correspondence with Israeli 
police trainer, May 2004).189   
A recent example of the success of this type of training was during a February 4, 
2008 suicide bomber attack in Dimona, Israel.  After the explosion, a doctor and nurse 
who were first on scene initially mistook a second, would-be bomber for a wounded 
victim at the site of the terrorist attack.  The two began to treat a young man lying nearby, 
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inserting a breathing tube and preparing to insert an IV line. When the nurse opened the 
man’s shirt she saw that he was wearing a bomb belt that hadn’t detonated.  They shouted 
out that there was a second terrorist and raced for cover, dragging a wounded woman to 
their point of shelter.  Police arrived just after the nurse sounded the alarm the bomber 
was alive and dangerous.  As the bomber reached for the detonator, he was shot by an 
officer.  After an estimated two minutes, the bomber’s hand once again reached toward 
the detonator.  The officer fired several more shots from an estimated two-meter distance 
to ensure the second explosive belt was not detonated.  After the incident the officer 
stated, “I acted according to what I learned,” his police chief said that he did “exactly 
what he had to do.”190  
The most effective approach to countering suicide terrorism, according to Israeli 
police, is not by relying on highly trained elite, specialized units, but by instilling a 
counter suicide mindset in every officer on the street.  “You can’t count on special units 
as the only answer,” one senior Israeli officer maintains.  “Special units are not the 
answer for terror. It is in the amount of people who are aware — having versatile 
policemen or multi-professional police.”  In this respect, the Israeli police— traffic 
police, patrol units, detectives, auxiliary police, and private security guards — should be 
trained to be aware of terrorism.  The “street policeman is…the most useful,” this senior 
officer maintains, “because he is the policemen who will be in the right spot at the right 
time.”191 
Efforts to stop a suicide attack can result in a premature detonation of the 
explosive which kills the defenders and attacker.  This can lead to increased wariness on 
the part of the police, who then may be more inclined to shoot otherwise innocent-
looking civilians who could conceivably be carrying explosives.  This is a particular 
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ethnicity than the target population.  The result can be deep polarization and a cycle of 
violence that may destabilize the target society and perpetuate the goals of the terrorist 
group.192  
All indications point to the fact al-Qaeda is still actively perusing plans to mount 
an attack on United States soil.  Because of the asymmetrical nature of terrorism warfare, 
perhaps the most effective tactic that can be deployed is the suicide bomber.  As 
discussed earlier, suicide tactics are shocking, deadly, cost-effective, and very difficult to 
prevent.  The war in Iraq and Afghanistan has afforded Islamic extremists an opportunity 
for perfecting suicide bomber tactics, techniques and procedures.  The end of the war 
could possibly shift the concentration of suicide bomber attacks from Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and the Middle East to the United States.  
As a nation, the United States has not developed a shared vision or commitment 
to preparedness. Although there have been significant strides in making the country and 
its allies more secure, safety is not assured.  The nation has important challenges ahead as 
it wages a long-term battle not just against terrorists, but against the ideology that 
supports their agenda.   
Many terrorists groups are likely to use suicide bombers to infiltrate target 
countries and conduct suicide attacks against critical infrastructure using weapons of 
mass destruction.  Terrorists have openly declared both their desire to develop and intent 
to employ weapons of mass destruction against the United States, its partners, and its 
interests around the world.  
While the vast majority of incidents are effectively handled at the community 
level, some require additional support from nearby jurisdictions or the state.  To 
successfully counter this method of destruction, a national multi-discipline suicide 
bomber response framework should be developed.  This framework would allow all 
Homeland Security identified First Responder disciplines to respond using 
indistinguishable techniques.  The effort of many organizations to develop training and 
suicide bomber response procedures needs to be commended, but the approach has been 
fragmented.  The following section brings together in a cohesive approach, an all 
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encompassing framework for what the nation could do to prevent, protect against, 
respond to, and recover from the next suicide bomber attack.  This framework is based on 
subject matter expert’s recommendations, professional organization training programs 
and writings from various academic scholars.   
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IV. THE PLAN 
A. STRATEGIC RELEVANCE 
There is no more important element in results-oriented management than the 
effort of strategic planning. This effort is the starting point and foundation for defining 
what an organization seeks to accomplish, identifying the strategies it will use to achieve 
desired results, and then determine how well it will succeed in reaching results-oriented 
goals and achieving its objectives. Establishing clear goals, objectives, and milestones; 
setting performance goals; assessing performance against goals to set priorities; and 
monitoring the effectiveness of actions taken to achieve the designated performance goals 
are all part of the planning process. If executed in a thoughtful manner, strategic planning 
is not a static or occasional event. Strategic planning becomes the dynamic and inclusive 
process for shaping the future, and success, of an organization. Continuous strategic 
planning provides the foundation for the most important tasks an organization faces each 
day. The process also fosters informed communication between the organization and 
those affected by or interested in the organization’s activities.193 
“Ours is a nation that must manage risk.  The threats we face — terrorism, 
disasters, and major emergencies — respect neither jurisdictional nor geographical 
boundaries.  We cannot prepare for every eventuality; thus, we must strategically allocate 
and apply limited resources.  We must adopt a common approach and establish a shared 
commitment among federal, state, and local governments in our efforts to strengthen the 
preparedness of the United States.  Only through such an approach can we build effective 
capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, 
major disasters, and other emergencies, and achieve the greatest return on our national 
investment in homeland security.”194  
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Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs) are developed at the federal, state, and local 
levels to provide a uniform response to all hazards a community may face.  Emergency 
Operations Plans written after October 2005 must be consistent with the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS).  This system is mandated by Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, which directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
develop and administer a National Incident Management System.  According to HSPD-5: 
This system will provide a consistent nationwide approach to Federal, 
State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together 
to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless 
of cause, size, or complexity. 195 
First responders such as fire service, law enforcement, and emergency medical 
services have been trained to respond to incidents traditionally requiring the disciplines to 
extinguish fires, apprehend law breakers, and save lives.  When first responders 
implement traditional procedures in response to suicide bomber incidents, these actions 
may cause unnecessary damage or death.  The International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP), which represents the heads of police departments in the United States and 
abroad, has developed training guides on proper procedures for responding to a suicide 
bomber incident.  Traditionally, a police officer is trained to fire at center mass first.  In a 
suicide bomber response the tactic is inappropriate for two reasons.  First, it may only 
wound the bomber, and a wounded bomber may still detonate the device.  Second, if a 
round hits the explosive device, it may detonate.  The IACP training guides state if lethal 
force is justified or authorized, aim for the head.   
Development of a suicide bomber response plan increases first responders’ ability 
to prevent, respond, and recover in a positive manner to a suicide bomber incident.  
Incorporating a few minor exceptions to existing standard operating procedures will not 
achieve the objective.  Response to a suicide bomber incident requires law enforcement 
to develop a totally new incident specific plan. The new plan is based on identifying 
specialized response procedures, increasing officers’ suicide bomber specific knowledge 
base, and exercising recently acquired skills.   
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All jurisdictions are different and have unique elements specific to their State, 
counties, or cities.  Therefore, one plan across the United States does not offer a realistic 
solution.  A more practical solution is the development of a framework specifically to 
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the next suicide bomber attack.  A 
framework that identifies the general elements required for such a response is highly 
beneficial.  This framework at a minimum includes agency responsibilities for responding 
to a suicide bomber incident, outlines the basic steps needed, and provides appropriate 
guidance to handle the situation.   
A suicide bomber emergency operations plan developed from the 
recommendations provided in the suicide bomber response framework is a better 
safeguard of first responders'.  Furthermore, the lives of a significant number of innocent 
bystanders can be saved that may otherwise fall victim to the attacker. 
B. EVOLVING THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has released two 
Training Keys, #581 and #582.  The Training Keys are titled Suicide (Homicide) 
Bombers: Part I and Part II, respectively.  Training Key #581 addresses profiles of 
suicide bombers and common beliefs behind committing a terrorist act.  By profiling the 
suicide bomber, law enforcement personnel can better understand the types of actions 
associated with suicide bombers and will be better prepared to prevent attacks.196 
Training Key #582 explains how police and other first responders should react to such 
incidents.197  
Through this thesis research, the IACP guides have been combined into one 
document with the most pertinent information as the foundation of the new document.  
Using readings from other suicide bomber response documents detailed in this section,198 
the essential IACP training guide information was expanded and an all encompassing 
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new response guide produced.  The new guiding framework is detailed in its response 
procedures so it can be used by law enforcement agencies to develop specific suicide 
bomber response plans.  The document contains a response element and a recovery 
element. The response element is comprised of pre-detonation procedures. The recovery 
element is comprised of post-detonation procedures. Reality may well reveal an 
instantaneous move from response mode to recovery mode. 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, engaged partnerships are essential to 
preparedness. Effective response activities begin with a host of preparedness activities 
conducted well in advance of an incident. The National Response Framework emphasizes 
preparedness, which involves a combination of planning, resources, training, exercising, 
and organizing to build, sustain, and improve operational capabilities, and developing 
jurisdiction-specific plans for delivering capabilities when needed for an incident.199 
Other law enforcement organizations have contributed to the preparedness efforts 
for a United States suicide bomber incident. The Technical Support Working Group 
(TSWG) has developed a Training Support Package designed to give the tools necessary 
to present training to law enforcement officers and other emergency personnel on how to 
respond to threatened or actual suicide attacks.200   The Los Angeles Police Department 
Bomb Squad has developed tactics, techniques and procedures that may be utilized to 
identify, detain, apprehend or stop suicide bombers or suspected bombers on foot, in 
vehicles, or inside a structure.201 Additionally, in November 2002, the Philadelphia Bomb 
Disposal Unit members attended training in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, Israel relative to 
suicide bombings and the overall construction of explosive systems utilized during these 
attacks.  Upon return, the team drafted a brief that focuses on identifying explosive 
systems and provides information which may offer technical consideration during an 
actual incident.202 
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These proactive organizations have developed internal training guides or 
programs to help their agencies develop programs for countering suicide bombers.  Each 
plan has merit and contains valuable information. However, none of the reviewed plans 
are all-inclusive.  This reality is indicative of the need for an all encompassing framework 
available for responding to a suicide bomber incident. The framework should be 
universally available so every law enforcement agency can use it to develop its own 
particular response plan.   
Suicide bomber response plans have been written for less than a handful of cities.  
No response plan exists for an entire state.  Agencies have approached the development 
of their plans from a local perspective, not from a regional, state, or national perspective.  
Although the plans have been written, none have been tested in a full-scale exercise.  
Therefore the effectiveness has not been validated.   
C. STRATEGIC BENEFITS OF THE NEW FRAMEWORK 
The benefit of a universally accepted approach entails allowing local agencies to 
jointly train and exercise utilizing the same basic plan. Cooperation between different 
organizations is imperative during an event of this significance.  The well-designed and 
realistic exercise becomes a valuable tool for informing policy makers of their 
preparedness status and relationship to broader strategic goals for homeland security 
throughout the nation.  Exercises play an instrumental role in preparing the nation to 
respond to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other public emergencies.  In addition 
to providing homeland security officials the opportunity to practice critical prevention, 
protection, response and recovery functions, exercises are a forum for evaluating the 
adequacy of existing capabilities plans, policies and procedures.  Exercises, and their 
lessons learned, allow the nation to more effectively target investments to continue to 
improve the broader cycle of preparedness including planning, training, and equipping 
the emergency response community.203 
In addition, exercises allow Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) to be 
reviewed, negotiated, and signed based on relevant and critical information available to 
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leadership. With the reality of overlapping and abutting response jurisdictions throughout 
the country, it is imperative for agencies to train and exercise on the same basic plan to 
alleviate elements of confusion. Given the complexity and lethality of a suicide bomber 
response, collaboration is an especially critical tenet for all responding disciplines. 
Until suicide bombings materialize in the United States, responding to the 
incident will be speculation.  Those who study and analyze terrorist behavior should 
attempt to apply what has been successful in other parts of the world to predicted United 
States scenarios.  The intent for the Suicide Bomber Response Framework attached to the 
thesis is to create a living document.  For the document to remain relevant, it must 
undergo continual revision and improvement based on individual situations and lessons 
learned.  When the attacks are executed, they can be analyzed and the results applied to 
this framework or any plan already developed.  Until such time, the nation must 
artificially prepare with the most realistic methods to ensure the responder community is 
as prepared as possible.    
The primary target audience for the thesis, and more specifically the Suicide 
Bomber Response Framework, includes every law enforcement agency in the United 
States. This cadre of professionals includes federal, state, local, tribal and private security 
agencies.  The manner in which an agency responds will be the difference in a successful 
intervention or the loss of many innocent lives.  The secondary audience will be the fire 
and emergency medical services tasked to respond to a post detonation event.  They too 
should have established procedures on how to respond to a suicide bomber incident 
versus a typical response.  Collaboration between the two primary responder 
communities is imperative. Each discipline must know how other plans to respond when 
the event becomes a reality.   
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V EXERCISE METHODOLOGY 
A. METHODOLOGY 
Because the suicide bomber tactic is growing in use and effectiveness around the 
world, it was decided by the Training and Exercise staff at the Delaware Emergency 
Management Agency to develop a Suicide Bomber Awareness level training course. To 
accomplish this task, various documents and training packages on the prevention and 
response to suicide bomber attacks were collected from a variety of sources.  The 
collected materials were developed by subject matter experts from the IAPC, New 
Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, the Suicide Bomber Mitigation Training 
Program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Homeland Defense Journal’s 
Managing the Threat of Suicide Bombers and Improvised Explosive Devices, the Institute 
of Terrorism Research and Response’s Israeli Experience Symposium, and various 
documents from academic scholars.   
The recommended response and recovery procedures obtained from these sources 
were compiled to create an all-encompassing framework.  The framework was presented 
to the State of Delaware’s Homeland Security Training and Exercise Committee for 
review.  The committee is composed of representatives from each homeland security 
identified discipline to include law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical 
services, emergency management, hazardous material, public works, governmental 
administrative, public safety communications, health care, and public health. After 
receiving the unanimous support of the Training and Exercise Committee, a Suicide 
Bomber Awareness course was developed by the Delaware Emergency Management 
Agency based on the Suicide Bomber Response Framework.   
To further expand on the need to be prepared for this type of an attack, a full-scale 
exercise was then developed with the scenario being a terrorist cell in the Mid-Atlantic 
region targeting dignitaries departing from an airport in Delaware.  A full-scale exercise 




solidified in discussion-based exercises.  Operations-based exercises can clarify roles and 
responsibilities, identify gaps in resources needed to implement plans and procedures, 
and improve individual and team performances.204  
The full-scale exercise simulates reality by presenting complex and realistic 
problems involving operations in multiple functional areas that require critical thinking, 
rapid problem solving, and effective responses by trained personnel in a highly stressful 
environment.  In reality, for an operational exercise to be successful, an After Action 
Report with an Improvement Plan must be composed.  The participating agencies need to 
make the improvements or changes to their operating policies or the same mistakes are 
probable on subsequent exercises or in an actual response.205   
None of the agencies participating in the exercise had developed suicide bomber 
response plans. Therefore it would not be reasonable to evaluate them according to the 
Suicide Bomber Response Framework.  To accommodate this reality, two sets of 
evaluators were used at the exercise. The first team of evaluators reviewed the first 
responders based on the typical response protocol to an incident of this magnitude 
according to the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Guides.  The second team 
of evaluators conducted their review based on the Suicide Bomber Response Framework 
and its uniquely designed Exercise Evaluation Guides.  Only the first team of evaluators 
was revealed to the participants during the exercise play.  After the exercise was 
completed the results from each evaluation team were reviewed to determine if a 
significant difference existed in responding under a typical first responder protocol versus 
what is recommended by subject matter experts in the Suicide Bomber Response 
Framework. 
B. REQUIREMENTS OF THE HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND 
EVALUATION PROGRAM 
Participants were evaluated using the federal Homeland Security Exercise and 
Evaluation Program (HSEEP) exercise evaluation methodology.  The Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation Program is a capabilities- and performance-based exercise 
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program that provides a standardized policy, methodology, and terminology for exercise 
design, development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning.   
In accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 and the National 
Preparedness Goal, HSEEP uses a capabilities-based approach to individual exercises and 
exercise program management.  In the spirit of the National Incident Management 
System, HSEEP promulgates standardized policies and terminology usable by officials 
and emergency responders at all levels of government.  The Homeland Security Exercise 
and Evaluation Program is accepted as the standardized policy and methodology for the 
execution of the National Exercise Program.  The National Exercise Program is the 
nation’s overarching exercise program formulated by the National Security 
Council/Homeland Security Council and executed by the Federal Interagency Coalition.  
All interagency partners have adopted the HSEEP as the methodology for all exercises 
that will be conducted as part of the National Exercise Program.206  
Exercises allow personnel, from first responders to senior officials, to validate 
training and practice strategic and tactical prevention, protection, response, and recovery 
capabilities in a risk-reduced environment.  Exercises are the primary tool for assessing 
preparedness and identifying areas for improvement, while demonstrating community 
resolve to prepare for major incidents.  Exercises aim to help entities within the 
community gain objective assessments of current capabilities so gaps, deficiencies, and 
vulnerabilities are addressed prior to a real incident. 
Well-designed and well-executed exercises are the most effective means of: 
• Assessing and validating policies, plans, procedures, training, equipment, 
assumptions, and interagency agreements; 
• Clarifying roles and responsibilities; 
• Improving interagency coordination and communications; 
• Identifying gaps in resources; 
• Measuring performance; and 
• Identifying opportunities for improvement.207 
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According to the HSEEP methodology, exercise evaluation incorporates three 
distinct level of analysis: task-level analysis, activity-level analysis, and capability-level 
analysis.   
1. Task-Level Analysis 
Tasks are specific, discrete actions individuals or groups must successfully 
perform or address during an operations based exercise.  Task-level analysis assists 
representatives of exercising entities in analyzing shortcomings or strengths related to 
individual actions.  The analysis can also help entities target plans, equipment, and 
training resources to improve specific task performance. 
2. Activity-Level Analysis 
Activities are groups of similar tasks, that when carried out according to plans and 
procedures, allow an entity to demonstrate an associated capability from the Universal 
Task List and Target Capabilities List.   
The Universal Task List identifies the tasks that need to be performed by all levels 
of government and a variety of disciplines to prevent, protect against, respond to, and 
recover from terrorist attacks, natural disaster, and other emergencies.  The Target 
Capabilities List describes thirty-six capabilities required to perform almost two hundred 
critical tasks. Critical tasks are defined as those tasks that must be performed during a 
major event to prevent occurrence, reduce loss of life or serious injuries, mitigate 
significant property damage, are essential to the success of a homeland security mission, 
and require coordination among a combination of federal, state, local and tribal 
entities.208 
When conducting activity-level analysis, exercise evaluators seek to determine 
whether all activities have been performed successfully and in accordance with plans, 
policies, and agreements.  Through the analysis, exercise evaluators gain valuable insight 
into broad thematic successes or challenges in performing related tasks.  Awareness of 
such themes is essential to improving the performance of individual tasks, and thus 
demonstrating the associated capability.  Such analysis is also vital in assessing the 
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effectiveness with which individuals worked together at the discipline or organizational 
level, and how well team members communicated across organizational boundaries 
during an exercise. 
3. Capability-Level Analysis 
Capabilities are combinations of elements that provide the means to achieve a 
measurable outcome.  Capability-level analysis involves assessing an entity’s ability to 
demonstrate its priority capabilities necessary to successfully prevent, protect against, 
respond to, or recover from the threat or hazard simulated in the exercise scenario.  When 
conducting capability-level analysis, exercise evaluators examine whether an entity’s 
performance of specific tasks and activities was sufficient to demonstrate the desired 
capability outcome.  Capability-level analysis is designed to assist managers and 
executives in developing operating plans and budgets, communication with political 
officials, setting long-range training and planning goals, and developing interagency 
and/or inter jurisdictional agreements.209  
C. THE EXERCISE DESIGN 
On July 28, 2007, a full-scale exercise was performed at New Castle Airport in 
New Castle, Delaware.  The exercise focused on the prevention and response to a suicide 
bomber cell targeting dignitaries departing the local airfield.   The exercise examined the 
effectiveness of existing State and local jurisdiction plans, procedures, policies, and the 
resulting coordination in response to a potential suicide bomber attack.  Critical issues 
examined include information sharing, coordination, communication, and resource 
allocation among departments and agencies involved in a response to a terrorist attack at 
the airport.  
The exercise began with pre-incident intelligence on a terrorist group operating in 
the Mid-Atlantic region 48 hours prior to the exercise start time.  Another more targeted 
State specific intelligence report was released 24 hours prior to the exercise. Two hours 
prior to exercise start time the intelligence evolved to a level that identified New Castle 
Airport and specific targets, tactics, and personnel who would conduct the attack.  All 
intelligence feeds were pre-screened by the FBI for authenticity.  The Fusion Center was 
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tested on their procedures for disseminating critical information to law enforcement 
agencies, fire service, emergency management and EMS.  Three aircraft were pre-
positioned at various locations throughout the airfield.  Each of the aircraft contained 
twenty-five dignitaries and five crew members.  On the morning of July 28, dignitaries 
from the State Department and Israeli business people from the Jewish National Fund 
America were scheduled to visit the financial district in Wilmington.  They were 
scheduled to fly to San Diego, California, and must depart the airport on schedule to 
rendezvous with Department of State, Secretary Condoleezza Rice who has guaranteed 
their safety while traveling in the United States.  Any delay or cancellation of the three 
chartered airplanes would indicate Wilmington is not a secure location in which to invest 
and could be an embarrassment to the national security. 
The focus of the exercise was on four separate scenarios.  The overarching 
scenario of a terrorist attack on the New Castle Airport is broken down accordingly: 
• Scenario 1 involved preventing a suicide bomber from gaining access to 
the passenger terminal, and identifying and detaining a handler (ANG 
ramp). 
• Scenario 2 involved an active hijacking aboard a commercial jet (Taxiway 
“M”). 
• Scenario 3 involved a suicide vest detonation outside an aircraft, causing a 
mass casualty incident with an unexploded secondary device (Taxiway 
“G”). 
• Scenario 4 involved a suicide bomber out in the open with civilians in the 
line of fire (ANG ramp).210 
The exercise scenario evolved in the following sequence.  The initial two aircraft 
had taxied out of the parking area and onto the taxiways.  The third aircraft was rushing 
to load passengers to make an on-time departure.  The aircraft were expected to depart 
within five minutes of each other.  Each aircraft had been infiltrated by two suicide 
bombers, who intend to strike simultaneously to represent a terrorist cell attacking multi-
targets.  The locations of each incident were to be the Air National Guard ramp, the anti-
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hijacking event on taxiway “M,” and the mass casualty incident on taxiway “G.”  On the 
morning of the exercise, a pre-scripted conversation between the three aircraft and the air 
traffic control tower set the stage for the exercise events to evolve.  One aircraft was on 
the approach end of the runway preparing to enter the active runway.  The second aircraft 
was taxiing out to join the first aircraft.  The third aircraft parked on the Air National 
Guard ramp was waiting for passengers arriving late for processing.   
Each incident was designed to test various areas in the Suicide Bomber Response 
Framework.  The first incident was staged at the Air National Guard ramp passenger 
processing station where the dignitaries would arrive on a twenty-five passenger bus and 
proceed through the processing line, into a waiting area, and then eventually be escorted 
across the tarmac onto the aircraft.  Once the passengers arrived at the aircraft a sequence 
of events unfolded.  The primary objectives at this juncture were to test law 
enforcement’s knowledge of suicide bomber recognition and characteristics, concentric 
rings of security, and suicide bomber “handler” recognition.  Additionally, the incident 
was designed to test two procedures, one for close quarter prevention within 25 feet when 
confronted with a suicide bomber and the other for open area confrontation on an airport 
ramp beyond 300 feet. 
The bomber arrived on the bus with the dignitaries and processed through the line.  
The individual playing the role of the suicide bomber was instructed to perform in a 
particular manner that should alert law enforcement personnel (e.g., clean shaven, 
mumbling “Allahu akbar,” avoiding eye contact, wearing inappropriate clothing, etc.).  A 
suicide bomber vest was pre-positioned in the aircraft lavatory where it would be 
strapped on by the bomber.  The scenario was designed so the passengers once aboard 
would wait approximately 30 minutes while events unfold at the other locations.  The 
pilot would then advise the tower he was concerned about the situation and would offload 
the passengers, sending them back to the processing center, a distance of 100 yards.  Half 
way across the tarmac if the bomber was not yet recognized, the dignitaries where 
instructed to panic.  Half of the contingent would run in various directions, while the 
other half would fall to the ground.  The design was intended to observe what law 
enforcement would do with a suicide bomber in the open with innocent civilians within 
the kill zone.    
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The second incident tested the airport authority and local law enforcement on 
anti-hijack procedures with a suicide bomber on the aircraft.  The aircraft was pre-
positioned on one of the taxi ways and role players were located inside the Air National 
Guard command center were they represented the pilot, and one of the suicide bombers.  
The air traffic control tower instructed the pilot on the proper anti-hijacking procedures 
according to Standard Operation Procedures.  Once the negotiation team arrived and 
made contact, the suicide bomber was instructed to make unreasonable demands and 
threats based on the negotiating teams’ tactics.  This portion of the exercise lasted 
approximately two hours.  Even though nobody was on board the aircraft the windows 
were obscured so  SWAT teams could not see movement inside the flight station and 
were unaware if personnel where actually located on the aircraft.  This portion of the 
exercise tested the ability of the SWAT teams to position for breaching an aircraft and for 
the negotiation team to attempt a dialogue with the suicide bomber.  This also met the 
requirements of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for the airfield to renew its 
FAA Part 139 Certification by incorporating all elements in responding to a hijacking and 
mass casualty events. 
The final incident involved an explosion in front of an aircraft creating a mass 
casualty incident. The scenario was designed for the aircraft commander, after listening 
on the radio to the events taking place on the Air National Guard ramp and the hijacking 
attempt on another taxiway, to taxi his aircraft to another part of the airfield and deplane 
the passengers.  While deplaning the suicide bomber decided to detonate his explosives in 
front of the aircraft, killing ten passengers.  Mannequins were used to represent the 
victims, with one serving as the second suicide bomber with an attached explosive vest.  
The other passengers were moulaged to represent various forms of trauma.   The design 
was intended to prompt the response procedures for a post suicide bomber detonation 
with a secondary device.  The emphasis was on scene control and access, force 
protection, radio use, triage, and evidence preservation.  In addition, each agency was 
observed on how well personnel utilized time, distance, and shielding once they realized 
a secondary device existed. 
Each incident was structured to facilitate the need for a unified command and 
prompt the implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS) structure.  Because of 
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the geographical considerations of the airfield, an Area Command would have to be 
implemented and the use of the Incident Management Teams recommended. Both of 
these requirements were pre-arranged.  This exercise was very complex and was 
intentionally designed to exceed the available resources of any single agency.   
Full-scale exercises are typically the most complex and resource-intensive type of 
exercise.  These multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional exercises test many facets of 
emergency response and recovery.  They include many first responders operating under 
an Incident Command System or Unified Command System to effectively and efficiently 
respond to, and initiate recovery from, an incident.  Events are projected through a 
scripted exercise scenario with built-in flexibility to allow updates to drive activity.  The 
full-scale exercise is conducted in a real-time, stressful environment that closely mirrors a 
real event.  First responders and resources are mobilized and deployed to the scene where 
they conduct actions as if a real incident had occurred, with minor accommodations for 
safety.211 
Although the responding agencies knew the exercise would consist of a suicide 
bomber scenario, they were expected to respond as they normally would during a high 
visibility situation.  No participating agency had developed a suicide bomber response 
plan. There were approximately three hundred participants from various agencies 
throughout the state to include state and local police SWAT and bomb disposal units, 
local and airport fire service, emergency medical personnel, and air traffic control tower 
personnel.   
D. RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EVALUATION GUIDES 
Exercise Evaluation Guides assist exercise evaluators by providing consistent 
standards and guidelines for observation, data collection, analysis, and report writing. 
Two separate sets of Exercise Evaluation Guides were used in this exercise.  One set was 
used by evaluators who evaluated responders according to standard law enforcement, fire 
service, and EMS response procedures.  The other set of evaluators evaluated the 
responses according to Exercise Evaluation Guides developed specifically for the  
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exercise which corresponded to the newly developed Suicide Bomber Response 
Framework.  A basic overview of the exercise scenario evaluation areas is located in 
Appendix A. 
There are two hundred identified observation tasks that were taken from the 
response framework.  The targeted observations were organized into seventeen categories 
according to related responses and added to the Homeland Security Exercise and 
Evaluation Program Exercise Evaluation Guide template.  These templates were put into 
a binder and the binders given to each of the selected evaluators.  The evaluators came 
from multiple disciplines and response backgrounds, but had the benefit of previous 
suicide bomber response training courses. 
E. THE AFTER ACTION REPORT PROCESS 
After the exercise was completed, separate After Action Reports were produced 
and then compared with each other to identify which write ups held consistencies 
between the two teams of evaluators.  The results were then filtered to identify the 
standard response procedures in need of agency improvement.  The After Action Reports 
were then compared to the suicide bomber response framework to assess if there were 
any stunning differences in the response procedures of law enforcement, fire, and 
emergency medical service agencies without a suicide bomber response policy in place 
and the proposed Suicide Bomber Response Framework.  
F. LIMITATIONS OF THE EXERCISE AND RESEARCH 
During the exercise planning meetings, the FBI indicated intelligence of this 
nature received on the airport would prompt a preemptive shut down of the facility.  
Keeping the airport open was deemed one of the artificialities that had to be built into the 
scenario.   
An area of response not covered by the response framework is the need to 
incorporate technology into the response plan, such as jamming or explosive detection 
devices.  
It should be noted the law enforcement agencies evaluated were highly trained 
from special weapons and tactics teams and explosive ordinance teams. The identified 
gaps could be more profound with the deployment of less specialized officers. The 
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contrived and artificial nature of exercises should not be discounted. Agencies and 
participants consistently demonstrate a less than engaged and committed attitude toward 
participating in exercise endeavors. 
Although a Post Blast Investigation was not conducted due to time constraints, a 
post-exercise discussion was clearly needed so questions involving crime scene 
investigation and the post blast investigation would be addressed.  In addition, the 
question was posed as to how forensics tasks would merge with these other post-event 
requirements.  There are many questions with respect to contaminated evidence, hand-
offs, preservation of crime scene, and roles/responsibilities.212 
While researching the procedures in the framework, and through conversations 
with law enforcement officers, it was identified the most controversial aspect of 
developing this particular type of plan was establishing a “shoot-to-kill” policy that was 
acceptable to human rights proponents and individual state judicial systems.  Law 
Enforcement officers need to understand the application of existing departmental use-of-
force policies to the suicide bomber threat.213   
G. SHOOT-TO-KILL 
The last few years have witnessed a proliferation of “shoot-to-kill” policies 
designed for use against those suspected of taking part in terrorist activity around the 
world.  In the United States, while not official government policy, the IACP Training 
Keys provides a useful insight to the content of the policies.  The IACP Training Keys 
are representative of “shoot-to-kill” policies emergent in the wake of 11 September 2001.  
The documents also have the potential to influence the adoption and implementation of 
future “shoot-to-kill” policies by United States police departments because the 
departments are currently debating the adoption of such policies.  Police officers are 
increasingly relied upon, and receive training in counterterrorism activities.  Local police 
departments have independent authority to adopt and implement the use of force policies.  
The IACP is extensively involved in the training of United States police officers, 
including training on the use of force.   
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The IACP Training Keys are emblematic of two trends in “shoot-to-kill” policies.  
The first trend is the use of certain behavior and other indicators to detect a suicide 
bomber.  The second trend is the removal of use of force safeguards. While the use of 
lethal force may under certain circumstances be both necessary and justified, especially 
when responding to the imminent detonation of a bomb, the Training Keys promote the 
use of lethal force even when the threat of harm is not imminent and where the very 
existence of a bomb has not been confirmed.  Instead, officers are encouraged to infer the 
existence of the “capability to detonate” a bomb or the threat of such use on the basis of 
overly-broad physical and behavioral characteristics, that will in the overwhelming 
number of cases end up targeting Muslims, Arabs and South Asians, or those perceived to 
be Muslim, Arab, or South Asian.214 
Specifically, the Training Keys: 
• Reject the requirement of imminent threat.  
• Omit reference to the requirement lethal force be “necessary.” 
• Fail to ensure responses to potential suicide bombers will be intelligence-
led and instead focus on ill-conceived stereotypes and behavioral 
indicators that are contradictory, over-broad, biased, and prone to error. 
• Do not reflect on the importance and nature of a command structure to 
ensure uses of force are appropriately controlled. 
• Fail to contemplate the wide-range of potential suicide bomber scenarios 
or the wide range of responses the scenarios may attract. 
One of the greatest trusts placed upon a law enforcement officer is the 
responsibility of balancing the constitutional interest of an individual against the interest 
of a society that believes the use of force against an individual is constitutionally 
permissible, when reasonable and necessary requirements under the law have been met. 
This balance of responsibility holds law enforcement officers strictly accountable for the 
discriminate use of force based on the lawfulness of the officer’s decision. Law 
                                                 
214 Racial Profiling and Lethal Force in the “War on Terror” (Center for Human Rights and Global 
Justice, New York University School of Law, Written Submission to Human Rights Committee, 87th 
Session, July 2006), 1-3. 
77 
enforcement officers must be ready to justify their use of force; within the constitutional 
and judicial standard of reasonableness at the instant the force was used.  
Every use of force application by an officer will be reviewed, critiqued, and 
ultimately judged by society, the civil and criminal courts, and the law enforcement 
officer’s agency or department. This evolving standard mandates a reasonable decision, 
by the officer, when confronted with a situation where use of force is applied. In most 
cases, the decision must be made in a split second, in circumstances which are tense, 
uncertain, and rapidly evolving.  
The standards of conduct controlling law enforcement’s use of deadly force are 
based on common law statutes, modified common law statutes, and model penal code. 
The standards are further modified by individual state and federal statutes, on-going court 
decisions, departmental or agency policy, and guidelines. The law enforcement officer 
must know the laws, policies and guidelines of the assigned jurisdiction, how these 
govern professional use of deadly force and how the use of force may result in 
departmental action or personal civil and criminal actions in state or federal court.215  
The U.S. Capitol Police adopted a “shoot-to-kill” policy for suicide bombers in 
February 2004. According to the policy, officers are trained to recognize the “usual traits 
and characteristics of suicide bombers” and are instructed to “aim for the head.”  The 
adoption of “shoot-to-kill” policies is currently being debated by law enforcement 
officials in the United States, at least one of whom has stated “shoot-to-kill” would be the 
“inevitable policy” following a suicide bombing in the nation.  On December 7, 2005, 
U.S. Federal Air Marshals shot and killed Rigoberto Alpizar, a 44-year-old American 
citizen of Costa Rican descent. Prior to the shooting, Alpizar and his wife had boarded a 
flight in Miami headed to Orlando. Following an argument with his wife, Alpizar, who 
was visibly agitated and clutching his bag, ran to the front of the airline declaring he had 
to get off the plane.  After Air Marshals became involved and began to escort Alpizar off 
the plane, his wife ran after them yelling her husband, who suffered from bi-polar 
disorder, was ill, and off his medication.  After being removed from the plane, Alpizar 
was shot and killed on the jet-way, allegedly as he was reaching for his bag.  Different 
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accounts exist as to whether Alpizar claimed he had a bomb.  On May 23, 2006, the 
staffing/review team investigating events at the Miami-Dade State Attorney's Office 
determined “the shooting officers were legally justified in their use of force and no 
criminal charges will be filed.”216 
Policies that instruct law enforcement on how to respond to potential suicide 
bombers must not remove the usual safeguards attached to the use of force. These 
requirements include:  
a. Proportionality, including in the context of use of force against terrorism 
suspects. 
b. Necessity. 
c. Use of non-lethal means where feasible. 
Removing the requirement a threat is imminent, and lethal force is necessary, 
encouraging the use of lethal force on the basis of mere suspicion, or failing to require a 
reasonable basis to believe the suspect has a bomb to detonate results in stripping the use-
of-force of its usual safeguards.  This removal or watering down of safeguards on the use 
of lethal force amounts to a tacit assertion that current uses of force standards are 
inapplicable or ineffective in countering real suicide bombing threats. Such an assertion 
misses the function of prevailing legal standards on the use of lethal force, which is not to 
deny law enforcement officials the authority to use lethal force when required, but rather 
to ensure that lethal force is used only when required.  Law enforcement officers may use 
deadly force only when “necessary,” that is, when the officer has a “reasonable belief” 
the subject of such force poses an imminent danger of death or serious physical injury to 
the officer or to another person. 
The context of “necessary/necessity” means no other reasonable alternative is 
available. All other available means of preventing imminent and grave danger to the 
officer or other persons have failed or would be likely to fail. There is no safe alternative 
to using deadly force, and without it, the officer or others would face imminent and grave  
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danger of death or serious physical injury.  An officer is not required to place their self, 
another officer, a suspect, or the public in unreasonable danger of death or serious 
physical injury before using deadly force. 
The context of “reasonable belief” or probable cause means facts and 
circumstances, including inferences drawn by the officer when deadly force is used, 
would cause a reasonable officer to believe the point at issue is probably true. The 
reasonable belief or decision must be viewed from the perspective of the officer on the 
scene, who may often be forced to make split second decisions in circumstances that are 
tense, unpredictable, and rapidly evolving. Reasonable belief is not to be viewed from the 
calm vantage point of hindsight. Included in the totality of circumstances used to 
determine reasonable belief are the factors of ability and opportunity. The suspect must 
have the ability to inflict serious bodily harm or death. This ability must be depicted by a 
deadly weapon (gun, knife, etc.) or the person’s overwhelming physical advantage (size, 
fighting skills karate, boxing, etc.). Opportunity is established when the suspect is in a 
position in which they can use their ability to threaten human life.217 
The IACP is the foremost authority to date in the United States on the 
development of suicide bomber response training for law enforcement agencies.  Their 
training guide is riddled with controversy over the “shoot-to-kill” suggested procedures.  
Much of the controversy toward accepting a “shoot-to-kill” policy in this nation is 
weighed against other countries not accepting this type of policy.  Before suicide bomber 
tactics become prevalent in the homeland and “shoot-to-kill” policies are hastily 
developed, agencies should at least start reviewing laws and statutes currently in place 
which can guide their states or disciplines in the development of a unified “shoot-to-kill” 
policy.  Through this preventive approach, the invested parties can ensure the upholding 
the civil rights of society and the professional integrity of their respective disciplines. 
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VI. EXERCISE RESULTS 
A. OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 
The most important short-comings of the full-scale exercise scenario are noted in 
this section.  The scope of exercise findings is multi-disciplinary in nature, with the 
strengths and weaknesses of each discipline bearing equal scrutiny. 
The implementation observed by the suicide bomber evaluators were compiled 
and the results point to a need for advancement in the following areas.  This list is not all 
inclusive but just a sampling of the disparities between Standard Operating Procedures 
and those procedures recommended by the Suicide Bomber Response Framework.  It is 
not the intent of this paper to report the total findings of the After Action Report, but to 
establish whether or not current response procedures are sufficient to prevent suicide 
bomber attacks in the United States. 
Most participating agencies enacted thorough response plans. However, many 
agencies lacked plans for integrated response operations.218 Evidence of this was 
demonstrated by the fact the Tactical Interoperable Communications plan was never fully 
implemented and law enforcement did not demonstrate interoperable communications 
capabilities with other participating agencies.  Joint planning and communication 
capabilities are integral to a successful response to an attack on critical infrastructure.219 
In addition to substandard planning and communication, several gaps in agency 
plans were identified.  Safe standoff distances, perimeters, and exclusionary zones for 
suicide bombings should be incorporated into standard operating procedures of all law 
enforcement, fire department, and emergency medical personnel.220 Shortcomings were 
noticed in the following areas: there was no attempt to capture withdrawing suicide 
bomber support team members; Neither site deployed counter-surveillance teams to look 
for individuals engaging in intelligence collection or to search for any logistical support 
                                                 




team that could be attempting to flee the surrounding area; and in addition, there were no 
attempts to apprehend those responsible for the attack or prevent further attacks. 
Although initial deployment to the terminal was adequate and conducted 
professionally, there was no clear indication of when command was established, who the 
Incident Commander was, or where the incident command post was located.  There was 
no transition from incident command to unified command.  No incident action plan was 
developed, and a communications unit leader was never identified.221 This lack of a 
strategic plan and tactical objectives led to confusion, this in turn led to freelancing at the 
incident site.  Instead of having a methodical approach to incident stabilization, 
responders lacked direction and clear goals.222 The early development of an incident 
action plan upon arrival at an incident site should be emphasized. The SWAT members 
had some difficulty integrating their response capabilities quickly because of the lack of 
an IAP.223 
Although incident command was eventually established to varying degrees in the 
field, incident commanders did not formally establish command or provide adequate 
initial on-scene reporting.  This resulted in discrepancies between incident command and 
area command, notably the variation in the naming of the incident sites, which led to 
confusion during communication between the two commands.  Because there was little 
effort to establish unified command at the incident sites, representatives from the area 
command were used to transmit communications.  This hampered the efficiency of the 
response.224 Therefore, most information shared among fire, EMS, law enforcement, and 
airport operations was exchanged within area command.225 
B. THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD INCIDENT  
The initial law enforcement response to the Air National Guard ramp, after 
intelligence was received from the fusion center, was well planned and organized.  
Uniformed officers established an outer perimeter, while plain clothes and SWAT 
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officers conducted reconnaissance on the immediate area, the terminal, and the vehicles 
in the immediate area.  However, outside the perimeter cars were not searched with K-9 
teams and Vehicle Identification Numbers and license plate checks were not performed.   
There were no concentric rings of security established with clearly defined roles 
and responsibilities.  A female role-player was allowed to walk across the aircraft parking 
ramp from the command post building to the passenger processing station, a distance of 
over a hundred yards, under no concealment.  She approached the back-side of the 
building where the passengers would exit after processing.  She did this twice before 
being stopped by law enforcement and questioned.  Had adequate security been in place 
she would have been detained long before she reached the building and became a security 
threat. 
Before the arrival of the dignitaries, law enforcement should have been searching 
the area for suspicious personnel, a third party (handler).  The handler in this exercise 
was located in plain view and was in position 10 minutes before the arrival of the bus.  At 
one time he was within 10 feet of a SWAT member for approximately 20 minutes; he had 
been standing in this location for more than an hour before Air Force Security Police 
(non-exercise players) became suspicious of him.  Law enforcement personnel did not 
engage the handler until they saw Air Force Security Police talking to him.  Law 
enforcement personnel then questioned the handler, and since he was not perceived as a 
threat at that time they returned to their positions.  The entire time he was being 
questioned, the handler had his cell phone in his hand and had a clear view of the 
processing center and the aircraft.  Approximately 11 minutes later, law enforcement 
decided he may be a potential threat and they took him in to custody.  After further 
questioning they released him once again.  If this scenario were real, then all three 
aircraft could have been blown up and at least nintey people killed.  Had law enforcement 
had more extensive training in suicide bomber tactics, they would have identified the 
individual as a threat with the capability to trigger the explosives by cell phone. 
Upon arrival, the bus transporting the dignitaries was directed to a parking space 
away from the main terminal where passengers could offload the bus under the 
supervision of several assigned law enforcement personnel.  Some passengers were 
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briefly searched and then permitted to proceed to the terminal security inspection 
station.226 Law enforcement was suspicious about the bomber and he was searched when 
he got off the bus. After a cursory check he was allowed to proceed through the 
processing station.  The passengers were not confirmed against the manifest.  Had this 
been done they would have seen the bomber was not listed on it.  The first suicide 
bomber was to have been a diversion.  The second suicide bomber (the bus driver), was 
to carry the explosives into the processing area once the passengers had been allowed to 
enter the processing line.  This plan was thwarted when law enforcement searched the 
bus and discovered the explosive device before the driver could get to it.  However, they 
did not identify the driver as a suspect and allowed him to leave the area. 
Upon discovery of the improvised explosive device, the bomb squad was 
requested and a SWAT team deployed around the inner perimeter.  A robot was used at 
the incident as much as possible but was unable to enter the bus where the explosive 
device was found.  Passengers were still allowed to board the aircraft per the Exercise 
Director, an artificiality that had to be built into the scenario.  Incident command should 
have quickly transferred to a unified command at this juncture, but this did not occur.227 
When members of the EOD and SWAT were asked where their incident command was 
located they responded by stating that the area command was the incident command.   
Tactical teams from the County Police Department and the state that were 
involved in this exercise need to train together regularly to become familiar with each 
other’s capabilities and shortcomings, and to establish protocols for an emergency 
response to an attack on critical infrastructure.  This should include a predetermined 
tactical communications method and pre-established contacts.  Because these tactical 
teams respond to incidents in the same jurisdiction, this issue must be addressed.  The 
tactical operations during the exercise ran well despite this shortcoming, mainly because 
of experienced leadership within the teams.  Training together and knowing each other’s 
tactics, operating procedures, policies, and plans for handling critical incidents will 
enhance the success and efficiency of a response.228  
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C. THE ANTI-HIJACKING INCIDENT 
There were no significant shortcomings to note at the anti-hijacking incident.  The 
county Special Weapons and Tactics team and their negotiator worked through both 
prevention and response aspects of the scenario.   
D. MASS CASUALTY INCIDENT 
The first-arriving units on the scene staged away from the scene and gathered 
information regarding the incident.  The Fire Chief, EOD Team, and assisting fire 
companies arrived shortly afterward. None of the units attempted to block access or 
otherwise secure the perimeter of the incident scene in which there remained a suspected 
IED.  No hot zones, warm zones, cold zones, or security zones were established or 
otherwise communicated to emergency responders. 229 
Access to the interior crime scene was not secured.  Individuals could have 
approached the crime scene from any point in a 360 degree radius; there were no entry 
control points.  None of the locations used crime scene logs to document activities and 
first responders were not logged in or out for accountability.   
Initial attempts by personnel on the Rescue unit to establish a perimeter were 
halted by County EOD after the possibility of an additional IED was communicated.  At 
this point, firefighters were largely inactive until the State SWAT team arrived on the 
scene and began to extract victims.  During this time, personnel on the scene did not (and 
were apparently not directed to) deploy around the perimeter.  Two witnesses to the 
incident were able to run through the incident scene to report what they had seen to 
firefighters.230 Had appropriate perimeters been established the witnesses would have 
been intercepted prior to reaching the incident scene, therefore eliminating or reducing 
the possibility of evidence being disturbed.  All responding agencies need to be cognizant 
that this type of incident needs to be treated as a crime scene and every effort needs to be 
made to preserve possible evidence.     
In addition to previously mentioned shortcomings, responding fire department 
units, incident command, and law enforcement units staged too close to the scene.  The 
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first arriving fire department unit positioned less than 100 feet from the outer edges of the 
victims.  The Incident Commander, followed by the EOD, also positioned on the scene 
approximately 300 feet from the incident.  They were followed by arriving EMS units 
that were approximately 400 feet from the incident.  EMS units and triage were partially 
shielded by a warehouse building.231 However, fire personnel positioned themselves 
between the explosive device and their vehicle, failing to utilize it as a protective shield.  
It was apparent that standard time, distance and shielding principles as applied to 
explosive devices were not being adhered to. 
In all instances, units responding to the incident were too close to the scene, given 
the possibility of an IED.  First responders did not seek appropriate cover and were not 
aware of blast concussion rebound or shrapnel effects.  The safe standoff distance (taken 
from the unclassified IED Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet)232 for an outdoor 
evacuation of a pipe bomb is 850 feet.  This is based on a pipe bomb containing 
approximately 5 pounds of explosive material.  For a suicide vest, which can contain up 
to 20 pounds of explosive material, the distance for outdoor evacuation is 1,360 feet.  All 
units and personnel operating on the scene were within this perimeter boundary.233 
Personnel from the Rescue unit told the Exercise Controller that they were aware 
of the potential for inadvertently detonating the secondary device through the use of 
portable radios.  The Rescue unit refrained from using portable radios in the identified 
hot zone, and used face-to-face communications whenever possible.  Proper exclusionary 
zones for radio use near an improvised explosive device (IED) were not explicitly 
stated,234 the safe radio frequency exclusionary distances were unknown.  Other 
responders may have been within this distance.235 This information was not provided to 
all the first responders at the incident by either the Incident Commander or area 
command. 
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Undeterred by a lack of personnel, law enforcement assessed the situation, 
determined appropriate operational procedures, and implemented plans.  Although the 
plans were discussed, nothing was written down or recorded.  This may have been 
because of the lack of available personnel.236 This situation could possibly have been 
alleviated by a fully functioning Unified Command.  Use of a status board or other type 
of documentation could be valuable to responding law enforcement agencies, both during 
an incident and afterward, when an agency is asked to recount its participation in or 
response to an incident.237 
The first firefighters from the Rescue unit arrived at the scene and staged nearby.   
Shortly thereafter, three members of the county EOD team were the initial responding 
law enforcement element.  Upon arriving at the scene, they began to discuss the 
information they had been provided, as well as their strategic approach.  They did an 
exceptional job of formulating a verbal IAP for their agency with minimal staff.  Law 
enforcement personnel at this incident were minimal because of the other three 
concurrent scenarios.  Mutual aid would have been used in a real-world incident.238 They 
did not request additional resources through the area command that would allow them to 
successfully respond to all three incidents in a timely and effective manner.   
Upon receiving an initial situational report, the EOD team repositioned its vehicle 
to a more strategic location.239 The county EOD team was the only law enforcement 
element on the scene for a large part of the incident.  They established an on-site 
command for their agency240since no unified command structure had been established.   
The Rescue crew members began to examine and triage some of the victims at the 
scene, but were pulled out, presumably because EOD perceived the threat of a secondary 
device on one of the victims.  Shortly afterward, the Rescue crew encountered two  
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witnesses who reported that there was an explosion with a white cloud.  After receiving 
the report, the crew remained outside of the immediate scene, awaiting direction and 
clearance from EOD to enter and remove victims.   
Firefighters from Rescue communicated to victims near the airplane over the 
public address system, instructing those who were ambulatory to distance themselves 
from the suspected IED, which was attached to one of the unresponsive victims.  Several 
victims were able to move away from the airplane, and were thoroughly searched by 
EOD personnel for potential bombs.  Meanwhile, those unable to move remained near the 
airplane, with rescue and treatment unavailable to them.  Additionally, an actor 
simulating a self-dispatching nurse was able to enter the scene and begin providing 
treatment to injured victims.  Attempts were made to persuade this nurse to leave the 
scene.  Had there been a security perimeter established, the nurse and the witnesses 
would have been stopped at the perimeter of the scene.241 The on-scene commander 
advised law enforcement about a person rendering medical assistance at the incident site 
who had professed to be a nurse.  Upon learning of this person, law enforcement stated 
that she could remain in the incident area as long as she was assisting and not hurting 
anyone. 242 
Seventy-eight minutes after the initial response an integrated team of SWAT and 
fire department personnel entered the area and began to remove victims.  Delays in 
entering the incident scene because of the presence of an explosive device or hazardous 
material are a precaution taken in the interest of responder safety.  However, in the 78 
minutes it took before entry was made, the condition of many victims in a real incident 
would have deteriorated significantly.243 In Israel they refer to the “golden ten-minute 
rule:” get to the victims during the critical minutes after an attack, when prompt medical 
attention—maintain airways,  controlling external hemorrhages — can mean the 
difference between life and death.244   
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When law enforcement entered the blast area to search for the victims they were 
moving the dead.  This was an unnecessary risk because of the potential for another 
explosive device on one of the bodies.  A robot could have been used during the mass 
casualty incident however; one was never utilized even though there was positive 
identification of a second explosive device attached to an incapacitated terrorist.  In this 
type of incident it would be expected that a significant amount of blood and body parts 
would be present.  First responders did not adhere to universal precautions for dealing 
with bodily fluids; at a minimum they should have worn personal protection equipment 
such as gauze masks, gloves, eyewear, and boot coverings.  When law enforcement was 
removing casualties from the incident area, the professed nurse indicated that one of the 
casualties had some type of wire or device in his hand.  The officers continued to remove 
casualties from the area, not focusing on the device until the last living casualty stated 
that the man next to her had a device with wires in his hand.245 Law enforcement could 
have used lethal force tactics against the incapacitated terrorist with the attached 
secondary device while simultaneously attending to the casualties. 
Law enforcement officers interviewed two of the initial four witnesses; however, 
the two remaining witnesses were not interviewed.  Officers questioned victims/suspects 
as they were assembled in the designated area.246 Additional information was provided to 
the Incident Commander by firefighters after two witnesses provided reports of what they 
saw.  This would have been helpful if law enforcement had started an investigation right 
away, each witness had information that would have helped in the investigation process.  
During the hot wash, personnel on the Rescue unit reported that they had communicated 
to command that the witnesses had observed a white cloud with the explosion.  The 
firefighter stated that there was a concern about the white cloud, as it may have indicated 
the presence of a chemical agent.  Personnel with another fire unit stated that they did not 
hear this radio traffic, and that it may have been broadcast on a channel not available to 
them.  The Incident Commander did not relay this information to other incoming units.  
As a result, detection and monitoring equipment on an assisting fire companies apparatus,  
 
                                                 
245 New Castle Airport, Full-Scale Exercise, 22. 
246 Ibid., 25. 
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which could have been used to confirm or rule out chemical involvement, was not used or 
brought to the location of the Rescue unit.247 The presence or absence of a chemical 
agent was never determined.   
During the hot wash, participants noted that the single channel all responders 
could use to communicate was crowded and confusing, as personnel at three separate 
incident scenes were trying to use it.  Responders stated that there was initial confusion 
about which transmissions referred to which incident scene.  The fact that all responders 
were working on one channel did not contribute to clarity and efficiency.248 
The initial EMS response lacked direction, as well as triage and treatment areas, 
until midway into the incident.  No EMS supervisor was identified nor was there one 
present when emergency medical technicians (EMTs) from the first ambulance reported 
to the command post.  EMS command did not arrive on scene until more than an hour 
into the incident.  Until EMS command arrived, there was no organized effort to set up a 
triage area or to assess and treat the patients who had been evacuated from the hazard 
area.  This was despite the fact that the need to set up a triage area was articulated by the 
Rescue unit and the first-arriving basic life support (BLS) unit. 
Throughout the triage effort, the ambulances were positioned in the road next to 
the triage area with their engines running.  They were lined up in such a way that they 
had to be driven toward the incident to transport patients away from the triage area.  It 
may have been better to stage ambulances farther away from the treatment area until they 
were needed.249 Furthermore, no police officer was designated to accompany the 
ambulances to the hospital in order to brief hospital personnel about possible secondary 
devices or preserve evidence if found.   
Emergency Medical Service personnel were not adequately briefed on the issue of 
the secondary explosive device.  The ambulance crews were not allowed to transport 
victims to the hospital until it was determined that they were clear of any explosive 
device.   However, during this waiting period, the ambulance crew remained in the 
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immediate vicinity of the walking wounded.  If waiting to provide treatment to the 
victims was a safety precaution because of the possibility of a secondary device, then 
responders should not have remained near the victims.250 
To sum up the areas of improvement that would be applicable for the entire region 
and across all disciplines are: 
1. National Incident Management System (NIMS) – Training and Structure 
with guidelines and policy. 
2. Perimeter Security – Use of concentric rings of security. 
3. Communications – No communications between units or departments. 
4. Preliminary Investigations – Training and sharing of information. 
5. No written policy or guidelines for suicide bombers. 
6. Interagency agreements – Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) and 
training. 
Marksmanship proficiency also needs more attention, especially at longer 
distances.  In dealing with IEDs the operating principle is both clear and simple: distance 
equals survival.  Improved marksmanship proficiency, coupled with ready access to 
urban patrol rifles, will greatly enhance officer survivability in the interdiction of suicide 
bombers.251 
The preparedness capabilities of U.S. domestic emergency-services agencies must 
be expanded and improved from the basic skills level up through the command level, 
particularly in development of the tactics needed to deal with the pre-detonation and post-
detonation aspects of martyrdom criminal attacks.   
Homeland law enforcement training, tactics, policies, procedures and technology 
all should be adapted to a “full engagement” mode to deal effectively with the suicide 
bomber scenario.  This is not theory and not a supposition.  It is, rather, one of the real-
life situational realities of domestic law-enforcement operations in the 21st century.252 
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The Suicide Bomber Response Framework tested in the exercise demonstrated a 
significant gap between response procedures cited in Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP’s) and what is recommended by the IACP and subject matter experts.   
Local law enforcement agencies will have to adapt their traditional policies and 
training to address new dangers when confronting suicide bombers.  Changes cannot take 
place simply on paper.  Nor can changes be limited to specialized units, because beat 
officers are the most likely to find themselves facing suicide bombers on the street.  
Those officers, as in all situations, must be able to rely on having received adequate, 
progressive training, not the luck of the day.  The traditional training given to most 
officers provides them with tools that may actually increase the suicide bombers’ chance 
of success.  Therefore, the United States should craft “a specific framework” for 
individual states to follow so they may develop a unified approach to a suicide bomber 
response.  The policy ensures a standard that police officers can be trained to in the likely 
event suicide bombers will strike the United States. 
B. A STRATEGY CANVAS 
The following strategy canvas in Figure 1 depicts an analytical tool that is both a 
diagnostic and an action framework.  The analytical framework of the strategy canvas 
serves two purposes.  First, it captures the current state of play in the known 
implementation of suicide bomber response framework in graphic form.  On the canvas 
strategy, the horizontal axis captures the primary differences between recommended 
practices and already established response procedures that are identified in the Homeland 
Security Exercise and Evaluation Guides during the full scale exercise.  The vertical axis 
of the strategy canvas visually captures the degree of emphasis the author perceived in 
executing suicide bomber response procedures versus standard operating procedures.253  
                                                 
253 Concept borrowed from “Blue Ocean Strategy.” 
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Figure 1.   Strategy Canvas: Gap Comparison 
 
The Suicide Bomber Response Framework was tested in the full scale exercise. 
The results indicate a significant gap between response procedures that exist in the 
current Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s) and what is recommended by the IACP 
and subject matter experts.  It is therefore recommended a suicide bomber response plan, 
drawn from the Suicide Bomber Response Framework, be developed and 
institutionalized into the standard operating procedures of the affected disciplines.  
The Suicide Bomber Response Framework in Appendix B should be 
recommended and made available to the affected disciplines for the development of a 
local suicide bomber response plan.  Every first responder, whether fire, law 
enforcement, emergency medical services, etc, should be cognizant of this issue.  
However, the predominance of the disciplines is likely to refuse to accept the emergence 
of this tactic as a reality.  Developing a suicide bomber plan will not be high priority for 
many agencies, with most balking at the notion of spending valuable resources on a plan 
deemed “unlikely to happen here.”  There will be a myriad of obstacles and excuses in 
every organization to the development and implementation of such a politically risky 
plan.  The acceptance of the framework by law enforcement may ultimately depend on 
the emphasis leaders in homeland security assign to the development of a national 
response plan.  The initiative for states and local law enforcement agencies to develop a 
suicide bomber response plan will undoubtedly have to be pushed down from the 
95 
Department of Homeland Security with correlating funding to support the proposal.  
However, every incident is initially local. Therefore, the final onus will be placed on the 
responding local agency in a suicide bomber incident as to whether the approach to a 
suicide bombing response was executed in a proactive or reactive manner. 
However, the determination needed to move forward and face these hurdles can 
be summarized in the cogent, immortal words of Dr. Martin Luther King, 
There comes a time when one must take a position that is neither safe, nor 
politic, nor popular; one must take it because it is right. 
C. TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS 
Once agencies have developed a Suicide Bomber Response Plan their training 
departments can create training courses at the awareness, operational and command level 
to educate not only their agency personnel but all the response disciplines identified by 
homeland security.  The Prevention and Response to Suicide Bomber course at New 
Mexico Tech is a train-the-trainer course designed to provide advanced training in 
responding to suicide bombing attacks. The course includes detailed instruction on 
improvised explosive devices (IED) and explosive materials typically used in suicide 
bombing attacks. In addition, it features range demonstrations of explosive effects and 
comprehensive training on critical response actions during pre- and post-detonation 
operations. The course addresses actions and programs designed to prevent or deter 
suicide bombings and techniques, tactics, procedures to respond to a variety of suicide 
bombing scenarios. Participants draft an action plan outline for preparing their agencies 
to address this developing, potential threat to communities in the United States.254  The 
Suicide Bomber Mitigation Training Program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training 
Center is designed for law enforcement officers and agents, who would be involved in the 
security of people and assets, needed to prevent a suicide bomber attack and may actually 
encounter a suicide bomber.255 The majority of these courses and packages can be funded 
at the state and local level using the homeland security grant funds, authorization will 
                                                 
254 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Preparedness Directorate (NPD), 
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http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/TED_Course_Catalog_2007.pdf [Accessed January 23, 2008]. 
255 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, catalog of training programs, 34, 
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vary by state.  Every state has developed a unique formula for dispersing these funds; 
therefore each agency will have to contact their state training officer for further 
information.  In addition, the homeland security grant funds can also be used to develop a 
state or agency suicide bomber course that could eventually be institutionalized into their 
state training academies.  The following table lists some of the Suicide Bomber training 
resources that are available.   
D. PRIVATE SECTOR TRAINING INFLUENCE 
A significant portion of law enforcement training is designed and offered through 
private sector military companies such as Blackwater, SAIC, and Triple Canopy. 
Engaging these training partners in the review, support, and delivery of the Suicide 
Bomber Response Framework is a critical in-road to influencing the evolution of the 
training and policy priorities of local law enforcement entities.  Many law enforcement 
entities address on-going staff training and development issues through these well-known 
private companies.  The training and curriculum priorities of these companies serve as 
influential bench marks to the law enforcement community of the United States and 
should not be over-looked as a key partner to implementing this strategy. 
Furthermore, the large private military companies have established contracting 
relationships with the Department of Homeland Security. The companies can also afford 
to employ the nation’s highly effective lobby firms. If the companies identified a 
lucrative, and relevant, law enforcement training opportunity, they would be an ideal 
advocate to pursue congressional funding appropriations for this worthy body of work. 
 
97 
Table 1.  Suicide Bomber Training Resources 
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APPENDIX A. EXERCISE SCENARIO EVALUATION AREAS 
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APPENDIX B. SUICIDE BOMBER RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 
The following Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures may be utilized to identify, 
detain, apprehend or stop homicide bombers or suspected bombers on foot, in 
vehicles, or inside a structure. 
 
Incident response 
 1.  Reporting – How, when, and by whom the threat is received will significantly 
affect the actions to be taken.  In the off chance that communication personnel should 
receive a tip or warning of a pending attack, communications personnel should take the 
following types of actions: 
  a.  Keep the reporting party on the line 
  b.  Identify the location of the purported attack or the location and  
                             direction of travel of the bomber 
  c.  Determine, if possible, the type of explosive involved, the manner of  
                             concealment, and the manner of detonation 
  d.  Accomplices or others involved 
  e.  Description of suspect 
  f.  Identity of caller 
 
Institute radio discipline 
 1.  Sensitive information should not be transmitted on the radio to prevent     
                 interception by the media, other terrorists, public, etc. 
 2.  Possible channel change for the entire event. 
 3.  Ensure dispatchers notify necessary/appropriate response units. 
 4.  Inform responding units on potential for secondary devices/suspects 
 
Immediate Notification 
 1.  Watch Commander  
 2.  Bomb Squad 
 3.  Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) 
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 4.  Airborne Law Enforcement 
 5.  Canine teams 
 6.  HazMat Resources 
 7.  Fire and Rescue 
 8.  Crime scene technicians 
 9.  Public Information Officer 
 10.  Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Local Field Office 
 11.  Operational Area multi-agency counterterrorism network (Terrorism Early  
                   Warning Group) 
 12.  Alert communications Officer in Charge 
 13.  Negotiator  
        Note: Officers should not attempt negotiation or give warning.  Neutralize    
                             suicide bombers once identified. 
Notification 
 1.  Governors office 
 2.  Office of Public Safety and Homeland Security 
 3.  State and Local Emergency Management Agency  
 4.  Department of Transportation  
 
Responding Officer Actions 
1. Vary route to the incident, final approach should be the same for all units so 
they arrive at the same mobilization point.   
2. Awareness of secondary threats and hazards (devices, shooters, downed  
       utilities, etc.) 
3. Ensure route does not carry responders directly through event site 
4. Expect to take casualties & plan for them. 
5. You will probably not be able to stop the attack, so the goal is to contain and 
mitigate 




A visible security presence has been proven to be a significant deterrent for 
suicide terrorists-large police presence can be incalculably disruptive to the 
execution of a planned terrorist attack. 
 
Incident Command Post 
 1.  First on scene search for secondary threats 
 2.  Terrorist will attack in different places, at the same time, or in succession 
 3.  Search Mobilization Points and Incident Command Post location 
 4.  Search area is cordoned off, working outward – 50m, 100m, 250m, etc. 
 5.  Identify and contain the suspect bomber 
 6.  Provide description of suspect and probable location of bomb 
 7.  Determine if deadly force is authorized and action can be taken effectively 
 8.  Conduct a preliminary investigation 
 9.  Immediately begin crime scene log to document activities 
  - Everyone must be logged in and out of the scene for accountability and  
                           legal proceedings (to include witnesses on the scene) 
 10.  Re-evaluate cordon/perimeter according to advice given by Bomb  
                   Technicians.  The responding Bomb Technicians will offer an initial   
                   professional opinion, which will include information on the explosive device, 
                   mechanisms, quantity of explosives, and whether it was a bomber or a car.  
 11.  Access to interior crime scene specifically limited to EMS, FD, and BT’s  
                   until scene is determined cleared by Bomb Technicians. 
 12.  Consider requesting assistance from structural engineers, utility personnel,   
        and similar agencies.  
 
Perimeter Zones 
 1.  The first zone is the terrorist attack scene and is determined by responding   
                  units; the responding reaction force and the rescue services seal the area  
                  almost immediately. 
 2.  The second zone serves as the coordination and preparation area for response  
                  to the event and the Joint Command Center is often located here.  However,  
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                  the commander will often go between the attack scene and the Joint Command 
                  Center in the second zone.  The location of the commander largely depends on 
                  the event and what the commander feels is important.  The spokesperson and  
                  the press are often located in this area.  Most importantly, this is the victims’  
                  area where they are triaged and treated.  The Supervision group is located here 
                  to coordinate the efforts of the forces enter the inner zone.  
 3.  The third zone is the sealing of the outer most limits.  It is need to assist with   
      the investigation, clearing of roads to the hospitals, and removing of  
      spectators/protestors.  Also occurring in the third zone are the attempts to  
      catch those responsible for the attack and the prevention of further attacks.  
       Note: In all zones it is important to take actions affecting other zones and  
                           coordinate actions to prevent other attacks. 
 4.  Zones may change due to other events, national/investigative interest, and  
                 ensuing activities or evaluation of the scene.  
 5.  The evaluation must be done immediately, within the first 15-30 minutes. 
  
Information Dissemination 
 1.  Preliminary report with general overview of Improvised Explosive Device   
                 (IED) and any officer safety information regarding secondary or radio  
                 controlled devices. 
 2.  Critical that all available information be brought to the attention of the Bomb  
                 Squad – on site intelligence, threat reporting, background, prior bombings, etc. 
 3.  Recommendation – FBI initiates FLASH message traffic to all bomb squads in 
                 the U.S.  
 4.  Balance the requirement to get information disseminated immediately with the  
                 need to produce VERIFIED information that will not jeopardize the       
                 investigation 
 5.  As the investigation proceeds, higher authorities will review the dissemination  
                 of information.  
 6.  Bomb Squad Commander should coordinate the release of information on the 
                  bomb/device.  
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 7.  While providing information to the public is imperative, it is important to  
      remember that a crime has occurred and specific details should not be released 
      (such as bomb details including bomb data); careful coordination with the  
      assigned spokesperson is critical.  
 
Lethal Force Guidelines 
 1.  To protect himself or others from an immediate threat of death or serious   
                  bodily injury.  The priorities for this response: Saving Lives and eliminating  
                  future dangers. 
 2.  To prevent a crime where the suspect’s actions place persons in jeopardy of   
                 death or serious bodily injury. 
 3.  To apprehend a fleeing felon for a crime involving serious bodily injury or the  
                  use of lethal force where there is substantial risk that the person whose arrest  
                  is sought will cause death or serious bodily injury to others if apprehension is  
                  delayed. 
 4.  There is no exception to the law or use of lethal force policy when  
                  encountering a suspected or confirmed suicide/homicide bomber.  Officer may 
                  not use lethal force to stop someone who is “merely” suspected of being a  
                  homicide bomber.  Officers must have probable cause to believe the suspect is 
                  presenting an immediate threat to life before lethal force can be utilized.  If an 
                  officer observes what appears to be an explosive device attached to the  
                  suspect, and believes the suspect presents an immediate threat of death or  
                  serious bodily injury to the officers or others, then lethal force is reasonable,  
                  since officers are trying “to prevent a crime where the suspect’s actions place   
                  persons in jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury.” 
 
Some indicative behaviors/external characteristics of attackers when initiating final phase 
of an attack 
1. Suspects apparent emotional state doesn’t seem to fit the situation 
2. Suspects clothing is out of sync with the weather, his/her social position (suspect appears 
well groomed but clothing is sloppy) or location (wearing a coat inside a building). 
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3. Suspects clothing is loose 
4. Suspect may be carrying heavy luggage, bag or wearing a back pack 
5. Suspect keeps hands in pockets 
6. Suspect repeatedly pats upper body with hands, as if double checking whether 
something has been forgotten. 
7. If suspect is male, face is pale from recent shaving of beard 
8. No obvious emotion seen on face/ affect seems flat 
9. Eyes appear to be focused and vigilant 
10. Suspect does not respond to authoritative voice commands or direct salutation 
from a distance. 
11. Suspect appears to be drugged or “in a trance.” 
12. Just prior to detonation the suspect may: 
  a.  Place his or her hands above the head and shout a phrase. 
  b.  Place hands and head close to the bomb to obliterate features  
                              permitting post-mortem identification. 
  
Containment of the Bomber 
1. NEVER approach the suspect/bomber 
2. Anyone approaching the immobilized bomber must have lethal force capability 
3. Do not allow the suicide bomber to move toward masses of people.  If the 
Bomber is already mixed in with the masses of people or is already closing in on 
them 
a. Sacrifice police dogs to take down the suicide bomber 
b. Engage the bomber with lethal force. 
4. Establish a security perimeter. 
5. Evacuate endangered citizens.  In open areas, firing a warning shot in the air to 
get members of the public in covered or prone position before engaging the 
bomber with lethal force may reduce the fragmentation effects of the bomber. 
6. If a car bomb or other form of Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device 
(VBIED) is involved; 
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a. Attempt to box it in using police and fire vehicles, commandeered heavy 
trucks, or hasty barricades and spike strips. 
b. Utilize vehicles for cover, at the appropriate distance – cannot be so close 
that vehicles become threats. 
c. Vehicles can be used to cordon off swept areas and control the flow of 
people/traffic. 
7. Block avenues of approach to high-value targets (e.g. state and federal buildings) 
in the surrounding area. 
 
Maintain Standoff Distance 
1. Utilize a high ground sniper team with a clear field of fire to cover 
approaching Bomb Technicians 
2. Utilize a robotic platform with video capability to approach the bomber 
3. Seek appropriate cover and be aware of blast concussion rebound and 
shrapnel effects. 
4. Minimum safety distance is 660 feet in all directions. 
5. Do not get close to a suspected bomber. 
Note: If the bomber cannot reach the intended target, he or she may detonate to 
avoid arrest, and, in the process, kill as many law enforcement officers as 
possible.  
6. If the bomber wants to surrender, or is wounded or dead, maintain standoff 
distance. 
Note: Bombers appearing to surrender may use this ruse to draw to draw in 
unsuspecting law enforcement personnel.  Even if the bomber sincerely wishes 
to surrender, he or she may be carrying a bomb that can be triggered by a 
third party (by cell phone or radio wave).  
7. Immediately search the area for suspicious personnel, a third party (Handler).  
This individual may have the capability to trigger the bomb by cell phone.  
Use of deadly force may be required to eliminate the threat by the handler. 
8. Dead and wounded suspects and their possessions may also carry secondary 
command-detonated devices or dead-man switches and other forms of booby traps. 
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9. Bomber may detonate when falling due to use of mercury switch fuzing. 
10. If the bomber is neutralized without an explosion, do not approach the bomber 
until cleared to do so by bomb disposal or other authorized personnel. 
11. If the system fails to initiate, do not roll suspected bomber on chest or side to 
cuff, cuff with palms outward. 
12. If a bomber wants to surrender, direct him or her to remove the explosive 
device or items carried and all clothing at standoff ranges. 
Note: This protocol will not play well in the media, so be sure to enforce 
press-access restrictions. 
13. Have subject show hands-palms open. 
14. Have subject remove all upper body clothing & turn 360 degrees before 
allowed to approach.  Look for a bomb switch on the torso area or in the 
hands. 
15. Challenge from cover/stand-off distance – One (1) officer should issue 
commands to bomber to avoid confusion 
NOTE:  Expect a secondary device or secondary suicide bomber in a few 
minutes.  Suicide Bombers work in pairs with second bomber or timed device 
for rescuers. 
16. Designate a Contact Person and Cover personnel with appropriate firepower. 
17. Work from cover & use verbal commands or hand signals to direct.  
 
Recommended Separation Distance 
 1.  Person Borne Explosive Device 
  a.  Evacuation of bystanders 
        Minimum – 100m (300 feet) 
   Optimal – 150m (450 feet) 
 2.  Vehicle Borne Explosive Device 
   Car: Minimum – 250m (800 feet) behind hard cover, 1000m (3250 
                                                                feet) in the open 
   Truck: Minimum – 400m (1300 feet)  
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Define the circumstances when lethal force is justified. 
1. Lethal force is justified if the suspect represents a significant threat of death or 
      serious injury to an officer or others. 
Note: Federal laws and rulings are better attuned to the type of national 
security threat that  suicide bombers represent from both a criminal and civil 
liability perspective. 
2.  The law does not require that the threat of death or serious injury be imminent. 
3.  One need not wait until a suicide bomber makes a move or takes other action 
potentially sufficient to carry out the bombing when officers have reasonable 
bias to believe that the suspect has the capability to detonate a bomb.  The 
threat of such use is, in most instances, sufficient justification to employ 
deadly force. 
4.  An officer need only determine that the use of deadly force is objectively  
      reasonable under the circumstances. 
 
If lethal force is justified or authorized, aim for the head. 
 1.  Instantaneous incapacitation is required to neutralize a suicide bomber’s  
                 imminent act 
 2.  Failure to incapacitate immediately may allow the bomber to trigger/initiate  
                 the device resulting in mass casualties.  Consideration must be given to the fact  
                 that suicide bombs have a 360-degree killing zone and casualty radius of  
                 several hundred feet. 
 3.  Less-lethal tactics are not designed for immediate incapacitation and are likely  
                  to result in detonation of the device. 
 4.  Suicide devices worn on the torso should be considered impact sensitive to  
                  bullets.  Police officers are trained to fire at center body mass.  Using this  
                  tactic against suicide bombers is inappropriate for two reasons. 
  a.  It may only wound the bomber, and a wounded bomber may still  
                             detonate the device. 
  b.  If a round hits the explosive device, it may detonate. 
 5.  If lethal force is justified, all shots should be aimed at the bomber’s head- 
specifically; 
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  a.  At the tip of the nose when facing the bomber,  
  b.  At the point of the ear canal from the side,  
  c.  About one inch below the base of the skull from behind 
 6.  An accurately placed head shot will terminate the bomber before he or she can  
                 take action to detonate the explosive device and will not accidentally set off  
                 the device. 
       7.   A fragmenting, high-velocity shot from a firearm such as an AR-15 at any of  
             the above mentioned areas is ideal for immediately terminating the threat. 
        Note: When using lethal force, remember to fire from cover to avoid the   
                             effects of a potential explosion. 
 8.  In some instances an officer or officers may attempt to hold down a suicide  
                 bomber without success.  Under such circumstances, take the head shot by     
                 placing the pistol directly to the bomber’s head in one of the aforementioned  
                 locations. 
 9.  Under no circumstances are “tasers” or other electrical discharge devices to be  
                 utilized against a bomber, as the charge they deliver may detonate the  
                 explosive device. 
 
Radio-frequency suppression and pre-detonation. 
 1.  Jamming devices can block the signals of cell phone- and command-detonated  
                 systems.  These jamming devices create an electronic barrier around an  
                 explosive device that stops radio signals and cell phone calls from detonating  
                 it. 
 2.  Jamming devices can also protect facilities and vehicles from command- 
                 detonated systems. 
 3.  Other electronic systems exist that will pre-detonate radio-controlled bombs by 
                 broadcasting signals across the radio wave spectrum.  Infrared, radar, garage   
                 door openers, motion sensors, and photocells are less typical methods of  
                 detonation, but various countermeasures exist to suppress or pre-detonate  
                 devices initiated by these methods. 
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Force protection operations. 
 1.  Defending the forces that respond to a suicide bomber must be a primary  
                 consideration. 
 2.  Not only do law enforcement assets need to be protected, bus so do fire and  
                 emergency medical technicians (EMT’s) and ambulance drivers. 
 3.  Secondary and tertiary explosive devices may be placed in likely command  
                 post and triage locations or along avenues of approach or egress from the  
                 incident scene.  Typically, such explosive devices are set on 20-minute timers  
                 to target responding forces enroute or clustered  together in “kill zones”. 
 4.  Suicide bombers have posed as emergency responders, such as ambulance  
                  drivers, to explode a vehicular bomb in the midst of emergency services  
                  personnel. 
 5.  At a minimum, command post and triage areas and avenues of approach and  
                 egress must be cleared for bombs, unknown personnel must be identified,  
                 snipers and guards must be posted, and responders should not cluster in large  
                 groups. 
 6.  Defensive operations should also include counter-surveillance teams that look  
                 for opposing force members engaging in intelligence collection against  
                 responding forces. 
 7.  At a minimum, responders should wear personal protection equipment such as  
                 gauze masks, eyewear, gloves, and boot coverings, as they will encounter body 
                 fluids and body parts in the blast area, and blood borne diseases may be  
                 present. 
 Note: Full scale decontamination capability may also be required if suicide  
                     bombers begin using chemical or radiological devices 
 
Post detonation 
1. Relay as much information as possible to communications concerning 
conditions, injuries, damage, and personnel and equipment requirements. 
2. Remain alert to secondary devices 
3. Establish as large a crime scene perimeter as possible. 
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4. Witnesses need to be questioned quickly and thoroughly soon after the blast. 
5. Establish appropriate media staging area 
6. Treat and process the area as a crime scene 
7. Bomb Unit arrives and immediately begins search for secondary devices 
8. Outside the limited area, command post is checked; crowds and cars are also 
searched with K9 teams. 
Note: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has developed a “Suicide 
Bomb Extended Message - Health and Safety Information for the First Hours”. 
It’s a guide for the PIO/Media to inform non-emergency responders located in the 




 1.  Aggressive and expeditious search of immediate area, followed on by more  
                 detailed search. 
 2.  The search for secondary device looks at areas near the wounded,  
                  concentration point of the wounded, near the concentration of the rescue  
                  teams, command post, and crowds.  
 3.  Second wave of officers conducts search of scene (two pairs of eyes on each  
                  area) VIN/Plate check. 
 4.  Check all cars, dumpsters, bags, etc – once cleared, mark “safe” according to  
                 an accepted marking system. 
 5.  One person assigns search areas for all officers – define and prioritize  
                  overlapping search zones 
 6.  Explosive Detection K9 Units deployed with Bomb Technicians 
 7.  Initial search by law enforcement, if something suspicious identified, then  
                 bomb technicians conduct intrusive search following request by Incident  
                 Commander. 
 8.  Bomb Technicians determine extent of search for 2nd device and make the  
                 determination of area to conduct physical search of vehicles on the street. 
 9.  Tag and log searched areas with Command Post. 
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 10.  Be prepared to adjust cordon, or possibly evacuate, given the identification of 
                   a secondary device or a follow-on attack. 
 
Medical Response 
 1.  Medical teams arrive at the site and immediately begin evacuating the  
                 wounded, while simultaneously the bomb technicians search for a secondary  
                 device.  
 2.  Dead stay on the scene, injured are treated by EMS or taken to the hospitals 
 3.  Designated officer rides to hospital with the injured – ensures no complications
  a.  Briefs hospital personnel of possible secondary devices 
  b.  Insure preservation of evidence (if found) 
  c.  Hospital should be made aware of the possibility of a second device or  
                             attack and be prepared to take appropriate measures. 
 4.  Deployment of forces to hospitals because they can become a target, and there  
                 is usually a need to restore public order. 
 
Establish a triage area and crime scene investigation perimeters. 
 1.  The triage area for injured victims should be outside of the crime scene  
                  perimeter and outside of the explosive range of a secondary device on the  
                  bomber or in his or her vehicle. 
 2.  An inner-perimeter crime scene will contain the explosion site or the spot  
                  where the bomber was engaged with lethal force.  Access to this perimeter  
                  must be restricted because of explosive hazards it may contain. 
 3.  An outer perimeter where first responders and investigators will work should  
                 also be established. 
 4.  In the case of vehicle bombs, more powerful explosives, and other  
                 considerations, a third perimeter evacuation area may also be required. 
 5.  If the bomber wore an explosive vest, expect to find the severed head a good  
                 distance away form the body.  Finding a severed head is one of the quickest  
                 ways to identify a suicide bomber crime scene. 
 6.  In the case of an explosive belt, expect to find the body severed in half or each  
                 leg blown away from the body. 
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Initial Investigation 
 1.  After the search and secure procedures are completed, but during the initial  
                 investigation, the bomb labs, crime scene technicians and other authorities  
                 arrive at the scene. 
 2.  Bomb Lab technicians produce an initial report to the Commander and Bomb  
                 Technicians containing expert opinion and technical information.  
 3.  Bomb technicians will assist the Bomb Lab in collecting residue in order to  
                 utilize manpower to clear the scene. 
 4.  Crime scene technicians assist with victim identification. 
 5.  Other authorities arriving on the scene are responsible for collecting body   
                 parts, clearing debris and turning life to normal.  
 
Suicide bomber logistical support team escape and evasion. 
 1.  A suicide bomber may or may not have a logistical support team. 
 2.  Affinity suicide bombers will most likely be acting alone or possibly with the  
                 help of a confederate. 
 3.  A logistical support team may exist, and if so, part of it could be attempting to  
                 flee the area surrounding the incident scene. 
 4.  A perimeter should be established outside of the crime scene, responder, and  
                 possible evacuation zones to attempt to capture withdrawing suicide bomber  
                 support-team members. 
 
Disruptive targeting mitigation. 
 1.  Mitigation strategies should include using public information officers,  
                 managing the press and restricting their access to the incident scene (including  
                 enforcing no-fly-zone restrictions on press helicopters and not permitting the  
                 videotaping of suspects forced to remove clothing), offering grief counseling,  
                 and working to clean up the incident scene quickly. 
 2.  The potential for a terrorist sting operation should also be considered.  This is a 
                 contrived incident in which law enforcement is forced to kill an individual they  
                 have probable cause to believe is a suicide bomber moving against a target, but 
                 who turns out not to be carrying a bomb. 
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      Note: This type of operation would serve as terrorist propaganda to disrupt  
                           national response  efforts. 
 
Rehabilitation 
 1.  Gradual downgrading of the deployment occurs and roadblocks are removed. 
 2.  Assistance is provided to local authorities as needed. 
 3.  Investigation and victim identification is complete. 
 4.  Most important during this step is summarizing of the event, which include  
                 debriefings and press information, and the drawing of lessons learned. 
 
Mission debriefing, lessons learned, and recommendations. 
 1.  Immediately after a suicide bomber incident has been dealt with, the  
                 responders, intelligence groups, and other incident support personnel must  
                 conduct a mission debriefing. 
 2.  A full investigation should be conducted through interviews with locals  
                 (friends, acquaintances, and neighbors of the bomber) to determine if they saw  
                 suspicious acts in the days, weeks, and months prior to the attack. 
 3.  Full details from interviews should be documented and then put into a timeline  
                 to look for pre-incident patterns (be mindful of legal discovery ramifications). 
 4.  Lesson learned and recommendations generated should be shared both within  
                 the area where the incident took place and with other law enforcement and  
                 responder groups throughout the United States.   
 
Psychological Debriefing  
 1.  Individuals involved should have a stress briefing within 24 hours of the  
                 Incident.   
 2.  Post trauma sessions occur with a psychologist because it is important to talk  
                 about what was observed at the scene of the attack; it is important to talk about  
                 what was witnessed especially if the victims were children and their were a lot  
                 of body parts.     
 3.  Post trauma stress disorder may occur after the incident with many victims; it  
                 is essential to notice any irregular behavior changes and refer the individual to  
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